Walden University

ScholarWorks
Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies

Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies
Collection

2020

Elite Theory Application to Social Privacy Concerns During
Domestic Government Surveillance
George Vahn
Walden University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations
Part of the Public Policy Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies
Collection at ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies by an
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact ScholarWorks@waldenu.edu.

Walden University
College of Social and Behavioral Sciences

This is to certify that the doctoral dissertation by

George Vähn
has been found to be complete and satisfactory in all respects,
and that any and all revisions required by
the review committee have been made.

Review Committee
Dr. George Larkin, Committee Chairperson,
Public Policy and Administration Faculty
Dr. Lynn Wilson, Committee Member,
Public Policy and Administration Faculty
Dr. Victoria Landu-Adams, University Reviewer,
Public Policy and Administration Faculty

Chief Academic Officer and Provost
Sue Subocz, Ph.D.

Walden University
2020

Abstract
Elite Theory Application to Social Privacy Concerns
During Domestic Government Surveillance
by
George Vähn

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Public Policy and Administration

Walden University
November 2020

Abstract
Policy professionals would benefit from a social theory capable of suggesting policy
change ramifications prior to public implementation. There is a research analysis shortfall
concerning the usefulness of elite theory in modern social change. This study was an
investigation of the effectiveness of elite theory to inform public policy analysts of
behavioral outcomes following policy creation or change. Elite theory is the theoretical
foundation that guided the framework of this study. The research question examined the
effectiveness of elite theory to suggest behavioral outcomes in response to reduced
personal privacy due to domestic government surveillance. A correlational research
design was integrated with a thematic methodology to analyze 8,223 secondary data
points obtained from a randomized sample of 1,537 adult, English speaking panel
participants across the United States from the years 2013 through 2015. Selective coding
using key word, key phrase, and subject matter matching was employed to assign
categorical values to panel responses about privacy and personal behavior. Themes were
identified and triangulated with themes regarding privacy and behavior that emerged
from the literature that was reviewed. The results indicated that individuals have strongly
held beliefs regarding privacy but do not undertake sustained behavior to protect it. The
results point to an alignment with elite theory suggesting that the social theory may be
used in policy development. This research is significant for both government policy
professionals and grassroots social change organizers as they navigate the potential
effects of policy change.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Generally, public policy refers to a system of decision making by the state from
which laws and actionable strategies are promulgated upon the public to address some
identified issue in society; public policy is government policy that affect the whole
population (Merriam-Webster., n.d.). In the United States, national security policy is a
broadly defined phrase that is rooted in the overarching need to protect the structure,
integrity, and framework of the state as well as the physical security of the citizens
therein (Aftergood, 2012). National security policy is initially formed by federal agencies
such as the National Security Council (NSC), and the Homeland Security Council that
advise the President who makes policy decisions. (Whittaker, 2011). Policy is ultimately
implemented through a regulatory framework created by and interpreted by the three
separate and distinct branches of government.
Governmental policy touches on virtually every aspect of life including food,
education, healthcare, personal access to goods and services, domestic law enforcement,
national defense, and individual privacy through the implantation of laws, administrative
codes, and local ordinances. Policy development on a national level results from the
federal government’s internal planning and response to an actual or perceived threat,
social need, or requirement of government. This includes public health, civil order,
physical safety from external extra-domestic threats, or homegrown domestic threats.
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Background
Following the terror attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, policy experts
were faced with a challenging new group of responsibilities both domestically and
abroad. In the decade following the attacks, international security threats morphed from a
predominately physical risk of attack like those occurring on 9/11, to bioweapon and
epidemiological attacks, cyber-attacks, infrastructure failures, data hacks, and direct or
indirect foreign influence campaigns. To combat this new terrorist paradigm, defense
policy shifted in large part from a boots-on-ground approach to a more complex
information-based 22 agency defense network capable of identifying terror threats in
their pre-execution phase (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2017).
Humans require safety in their everyday lives second only to physiological needs
like air and water. (Maslow, 1954). However, inherence to information-based safety
policy is often a tradeoff wherein security becomes more robust at the expensive of
increased data aggregation and the diminishment of individual civil liberties (Eidam,
2017). Citizen data donors may not be consciously aware of or involved in the data
aggregation network that underlies data surveillance programs. Government data mining
is most often accomplished through nontransparent mechanisms and third-party
commercial data venders that are associated with social media, tele-communications, and
private utility companies (Leetaru, 2019).
Even those individuals generally resistant to data sharing in a perceived lowthreat environment may choose purposeful data donation when they believe they are in a
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high-risk threat environment believing it may move them from a higher to a lower risk
state. Even when individuals are aware that their data will be shared with the government,
they are often unaware why, how, or to whom the data is ultimately being provide (see
Pew research datasets below).
The relationship between high and low risk states may be described as a securefreedom continuum. Many individuals will exchange degrees of safety and security along
this continuum for rights and freedoms including privacy. In the human hierarchy of
needs safety is paramount (Maslow, 1954). National security policy professionals and
legislators are challenged to position the population in the safety continuum such that
society will achieve an acceptable balance of safety, privacy, and freedom.
The social effects of security policy changes may not be known during the policy
creation stage and it is not until they are implemented, with social feedback generated
and analyzed that determinations of effectiveness can be understood. There are only a
few mechanisms available to policy professionals that assist them in intelligently
choosing one policy creation scenario over another with some level of outcome-based
certainty. Individuals tasked with obtaining policy objectives may benefit from an
additional theoretical model capable of assisting with predicate outcomes of collateral
social consequences. If a reliable outcome-based theory could be implemented at the
beginning of policy creation, outcomes could align more accurately with policy
objectives.
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One potentially useful theoretical tool for suggesting future social behavior is elite
theory. Elite theorists suggest that only a relatively small, elite sub-group of groups or
individuals can make sound social policy decisions (Pareto, 1935). If this theory is
accurate it could be applied to a variety of policy judgments and may allow for the virtual
disregard of collateral social effects when forming initial policy strategy. I designed this
study to test the hypothesis that elite theory may be employed as a tool for understanding
social change. I am not aware of another study designed to inform scholars whether elite
theory may be an instrument of social policy analysis.
My study used public awareness of the United States government’s domestic data
surveillance and eavesdropping program to evaluate individuals’ reaction in response to
threats against a civil liberty (privacy), and to determine whether there is a relationship
between the two. I examined if elite theory may be useful as an analysis component
during initial drafting of security policy. The result of this study may provide insight into
the viability of adopting elite theory as a modern tool applicable to the creation and
analysis of other national security policy.
This first chapter will serve to establish the significance of the research, introduce
the reader to the content in the remainder of the study, discuss important terms, explain
assumptions, and identify possible limitations of the study. A thematic analytical
approach is used to synthesize different types of scholarly literature, pre-existing studies,
and publicly sourced secondary data to offer a perspective not previously available to
policy professionals.
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Statement of the Problem
In the aftermath of 9/11, policy makers across the nation were confronted with the
task of protecting the American public from exposure to catastrophic attacks in the future.
The methods used by terrorists on 9/11 drew attention to a different tactic of terrorism not
previously encountered on such a scale. The terror offensive used civilian aircraft as
guided weapons achieving a high fatality ratio on domestic soil and it became clear that
this form of terrorism could not be neutralized by conventional wartime tactics as there
was no direct state actors involved. Instead, nonlinear dynamic defense strategies would
have to be created to meet the new threat. This would ultimately be accomplished not by
using more munitions against the enemy but by using more information. Policy makers
concluded that the most effective way to fight terror on American soil was to preemptively prevent actions during their initial preattack phases. This could be
accomplished through domestic and international offensive information campaigns but
would require enormous quantities of data.
An active participation and prevention strategy would require local law
enforcement and federal government agencies to acquire, analyze, and share massive
amounts of data on every individual in the country to stay one step ahead of terrorist
planning and execution. Operationally, staying ahead requires unobstructed access to
current, dynamically updated information regarding enemy access to planning and
resources. Obtaining information on a scale large enough to be effective means creating a
virtual digital fishing net capable of extracting and amassing enormous volumes of data
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from the lives of hundreds of millions of individuals while simultaneously developing an
algorithmic system robust enough to analyze and report on it in near real time.
With the integrating of proprietary government technologies and large
private corporations’ access to individuals’ data, U.S. intelligence agencies were able to
develop programs capable of obtaining and retaining incredibly large volumes data on
American citizens including the Utah Data Center (UDC) which is said to be capable of
storing over 5 zettabytes of private information on individuals; equivalent to 100 years of
worldwide communication (Berkes, H. 2013). Although this could yield information
potentially useful to predict and prevent future terror attacks (albeit with debatable
effectiveness), the capability came at a price paid in privacy. The fundamental challenge
to policy makers is to balance the security requirements of the government while
anticipating the collateral social consequence associated with a specific policy. If it were
possible to employ a policy proposal mechanism prior to policy implementation then
legislators and analysts could focus on policies that would be effective while
simultaneously not producing unanticipated implementation results. I was not able to find
literature addressing this specific subject and so the potential for using elite theory as a
model was worth considering.
This study was designed to address a gap in the literature by examining the
relationship between domestic government surveillance programs (the independent
variable), and changes in individual protective privacy behavior (the dependent variable).
The results could inform policy scholars and advisors on whether a program may or may
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not be implemented with anticipation of social repercussions. This knowledge would
assist policy professionals as they craft new policy or modify existing policy to satisfy
national security goals.
Purpose of the Study
This study was designed to evaluate the potential relationship between the
independent variable (government-sanctioned reductions of the civil liberty personal
privacy), and the dependent variable (society’s individual privacy-protective behavior in
consideration of the government’s known domestic monitoring programs). The study was
undertaken following my realization that no other found research has directly addressed
whether elite theory could be used to suggest social response following governmental
policy action.
The research result could suggest whether elite theory may be useful in current
national security policy analysis. The study is designed to test the hypothesis that elite
theory is a reliable indicator of how the United States’ population may behave in
response to a forced reduction in civil liberty (privacy) and by extension to other aspects
of changed social policy.
Elite theorists suggest that a nonelite population is largely apathetic to [national
security] policy and is devoid of sustained investment in the protection of individual
privacy rights (Pareto, 1935). I was unable to locate any other study that suggests whether
elite theory may be used to evaluate social change outcomes. This study was undertaken
to fill that void in the literature. The research will assist security policy makers, analysts,
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and academics in their understanding of how elite theory may be used as a modern policy
tool capable of describing social change outcomes.
Research Question
I sought to understand whether there is a relationship between knowledge of the
government’s secret domestic spy programs and subsequent changes in individual
behavior in response to it. The study independent variable (IV) was the public knowledge
of government covert domestic personal data collection programs and the dependent
variable (DV) was the individual behavior-based social response to it.
These variables were analyzed alongside Pew research secondary datasets using
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software to identify relationships
between the variables. Effect size and trend information are also considered when
determining significance and strength of any relationship identified. The research
question and testable hypothesis is as follows:
RQ1: Using existing studies and secondary data; what is the nature of the
relationship among the independent variable (domestic government monitoring) and the
dependent variable (individual protective behavior)?
H01: There is a positive and significant relationship between the independent
variable (domestic government monitoring), and the dependent variable
(individual protective behavior).
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Ha1: There is no significant relationship between the independent variable
(domestic government monitoring), and the dependent variable (individual
protective behavior).
Conceptional Framework
The methodology used to evaluate this question is based on elite theory and used
both thematic analysis and secondary datasets facilitating a quantitative examination of
the hypothesis that there is no significant relationship between the variables, domestic
government monitoring and individual protective behavior.
A thematic analysis of several prior research studies was used to inform my
analysis of Pew research data sets providing broad access to a large sample population
not otherwise available in consideration of financial and logistical constraints while at the
same time offering a concise evaluation of whether a population will respond to
surveillance. Chapter 3 will outline the datasets provided by Pew research and the
methodology used to choose the informational elements included in the statistical
analysis. Statistical information from the Pew datasets will be combined with a thematic
analysis of existing scholarship and legal caselaw to provide a robust research result.
Single slice and multiple instance data from Pew were combined with scholarly
articles and journals providing the reader with an understanding of the data in an
overarching context. Datasets were selected using a specific criterion developed for use
in this study to minimize bias and maximize use of the thematic analysis technique.
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Assumptions
The following assumptions were necessary for this study because there were no
reasonable ways to independently verify the veracity or eliminate assumptions of quality
of the data. Deductive thematic analysis using a latent approach applied to multiple
source research may in a more valid and more useful result than a single source option
would have. The Pew data was assumed to be accurate and the participants honest in their
answers. The data was assumed to be acquired using a proper and scientifically sound
technique according to the methods indicated by the Pew research survey methodology
(Pew, 2020).
Limitations
There may be limitations associated with sample-based studies that use
structured-question data (normally associated with quantitative data collection methods),
that exclude the flexibility associated with (qualitative) open-ended questions. Research
limitations may also include constraints on the generalization and future applicability of
the research results that have been produced from a finite, self-reporting sample
population.
The Institutional Review Board (IRB) of Walden University preapproved the plan
for my research under approval number 08-17-18-0512335 ensuring that the assumptions
and modeling were designed within the appropriate limitations of hypothesis testing
acceptable for an academic paper. This ensured not only that the research was ready for
publication but that it was suitable for use in future studies as well.
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Significance of the Study
Drafting and fine-tuning public policy in a way that fulfills the requirements of
national security while simultaneously integrating into a social construct and a preexisting legislative framework may be challenging. There may be social and political
implications associated with any policy decision but those associated with national
security may rank among the most important in constituent value and public concern. The
research presented in this paper is significant because the result addressed these
challenges and provided national security professionals with an understanding necessary
to mitigate predictive challenges associated with creation and implementation of national
security policy. The potential effect of this research with respect to social change may be
profound.
If policy advisors can predict how a society or subvariant will behave in response
to policy change then the implementation of policy will no longer be susceptible to
reactionary unknows. Rather, policy makers may be able to predetermine responses and
craft domestic policy with relative impunity and with the knowledge that their decisions
will ultimately be accepted by society. This study may broaden the policy communities’
understanding of how theory informs policy development and how policy professionals
may take advantage of that relationship.
Summary
This research study was necessary to assist policy experts facing security
challenges that require predictable strategies for achieving policy objectives. The
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research allows analysts to review cause and effect relationships necessary to make
predictions that assist in the policy drafting and implementation process. The design uses
Pew research data obtained through structured data-collection techniques and uses
statistical analysis to show the response of a national population. Chapter 2 of this study
explains how thematic analysis of existing research is used to provide context and
identify common effect across research studies.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Meaningful social change may benefit from the creation and implementation of
newly formed social policies effecting society at both the national and individual level.
Drafting new social policy without predictable outcomes creates a challenge for policy
professionals. They are left to guess how policy changes could affect populations far into
the future. Policy experts may also need to account for the potential of collateral social
consequences not intended by the primary policy goal. For example, a social policy
requiring gun owners to register their firearms may primarily offer safety related benefits
but may also be construed as an unconstitutional infringement of second amendment
rights resulting in reduced compliance and increased government distrust.
The use of a social theory as a screening tool for proposed policy changes prior to
implementation of those changes may be useful in mitigating collateral consequences. As
a theoretical tool social-theory constructs may be included in the framework of a
proposed policy and potentially used to suggest outcomes. Foresight into how a new
policy will render over time may be invaluable to those tasked with creating it and may
help to protect social structures from undesirable collateral changes.
Pareto described the elite theory social construct as social representation of a
nonelite general population that is unable or unwilling to produce more desirable social
outcomes than those in the elite class (Pareto, 1935). This paper examined whether there
the theory may be used to suggest population behavior. If elite theory operating as a
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policy analysis tool can provide social forecasting then it may prove to be a critical
component in the creation of social change.
In this study I investigated whether there is a significant relationship between
changes in perceptions about privacy and changes in individual privacy behavior. A
relationship between these variables may signal the appropriate use of elite theory as a
tool for informing policy makers of a population’s future action prior to policy
implementation.
I examined elite theory as applied in a post-9/11 security paradigm wherein there
is a bipolar relationship between personal privacy and governmental intrusiveness. The
post-9/11 environment in conjunction with leaked top-secret intelligence information
provided a unique window of opportunity for research into government data monitoring
programs and the effects they may produce in society. This research is important because
national security policy touches every individual in the United States population. The
ability to predict policy outcomes may be important to ensure that a proposed social
change will benefit society or result in conformance with the primary intent of those
implementing it.
Literature Relevance
The timing of this study was relevant because government mass monitoring
programs are by nature highly secretive and the classified materials needed to understand
them are not normally available to the public, academics, or nongovernment analysists
(Federation of American Scientists, n.d.). However, following several prominent leaks of
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top-secret information into the public domain beginning in 2013 (Sottek & Kopfstein,
2013), academics and private citizens were offered insight into some of the government’s
secret data collection programs and the associated policy strategies that the government
had chosen to use.
I found research referencing privacy and elite theory to be compartmentalized and
not addressing the usefulness of elite theory as a predictor of social policy outcomes in a
modern population. This research study was necessary to better understand that
relationship and to accurately assess elite theory as a potential policy tool. I addressed
this topic within a holistic framework so that the reader may be better able to integrate
theory with practice than would be otherwise be possible.
Literature Search Strategy
The literature review was undertaken to provide scholars and policy creators with
a contextual framework from within which to understand the underlying components of
privacy and surveillance discussed in this study. It was a jumping off point designed to
provide readers with a predigested review of existing information related to the topics
analyzed in the study.
Using information obtained from legal cases, historical documents, media
sources, and peer reviewed journals this review provided a synthesized understanding of
the how privacy is defined, what government mass monitoring in the United States looks
like, and what the components of the elite theory social construct are.
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Theoretical Foundation
The theoretical foundation for this study was elite theory. Social theorists have
tried to explain the function and phenomena of societies and modern social science
appears to finds its roots in interdisciplinary social theory. Individual social theories vary
in both depth and breadth as they attempt to explain everything from the nature of an
individual’s behavior in society to a broad accounting for why entire populations behave
as they do. The most recent trends include the adaptation and merging of multiple
theories (to the exclusion of single theory explanations), to explain how a society will
function (Webber, 1968). It is life experience and a personal orientation disfavoring
elitism and privilege that brings me to the social construct of elite theory. I have tried to
develop an overarching understanding of national security, government function, and
social policy in order to present the topics in a coherent, research driven paper that may
help others understand it as well.
A better understanding of elite theory may support policy decision making by
equipping researchers with a theoretical basis from which they can analyze policy. Elite
theorist may seek to describe the relationship of a population’s power distribution in
specific societal contexts and the decision-making powers that flow from that relationship
may provide broad applicability to policy review in consideration of the current social
backdrop in the United States.
Elite theory may offer a parallel explanation describing the differences between
those in power and those in nonpower positions in society. Elite theory appears broader
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and more applicable than periphery concepts like asymmetrical power structures, a state
of exception, counter laws, or sovereignty double-speak (Morwood, 2012).
As a social concept elite theory may explain the counterintuitive relationship
demonstrated by a society that appears to assign high value to individual privacy while
simultaneously acquiescing to the dissolution of basic privacy protections. Although the
effectiveness of applying elite theory may be questionable in other nations like Russia,
North Korea, or China where the top-down political power structure is different than in
America, the theory appears valid for use in this study because of an inherent accounting
for the structure, form, and function of the quasi-democratic political system and diverse
social makeup of the population of the United States.
Elite theorist posited that a small subsection of society (designated as elites or
chosen ones) will inevitably control the affairs of the public (López, 2013). Ideologically,
this may be because the traits of those most suited to govern (wealth, stature, intelligence,
power, etc.) are distributed to only a small fraction of potential leaders. The theorists
suggest that the remainder of the populous is uninformed, incapable of making policy
decisions, or prone to anarchy and civil disturbance (López, 2013). Historically, the
theory may be described in several variations including cost, crisis, and lack of
willpower.
The idea of an uninformed public that is described by elitism may closely parallel
other historical theories of public disconnect relating to civil policy. In 1957, Downs
(2003) first spoke of the nonelite’s rational ignorance. The theory conforms to the idea
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that the public will avoid the purchase of knowledge or information (when it has a cost
associated with it), because the public does not believe the cost will outweigh the benefit
to them (e.g. that their vote could realistically impact an election, or a restriction on freely
available information would materially affect their lives, (Downs, 2003).
Years before Downs’ (1957) work, Lippmann (1922) opined that the public is
apathetic, uninformed, and careless in their perceptions. Lippmann suggested a more
modern yet parallel social theory that described public opinion as forming around crisis
and subsequently fading over time. Lippmann’s work argued that the public exhibit this
absence of informed opinion due to a disinterest and lack of will to engage the time and
resources required to be informed (Lippmann, 1922).
In 2016, Somin (2016) laid out a background explaining the long history of
assumed ignorance by the public when it comes to politics and national policy and
described the potential threat that it poses to democracy. Somin wrote that because
individuals can not directly impact elections it is rational to assume that there is no
incentive in becoming an informed voter despite acknowledging that this would
potentially result in an unwanted outcome at the collective level (Somin, 2016).
Ignorance of policy and related decision making may not mean uninformed
individuals cannot or do not affect policy. Where government action is largely positive or
negative and individuals can see and identify with such an action or event those
individuals may vote accordingly irrespective of valid rationality. It may be that the result
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of ignorant voting is to further policies allowing for the future manipulation of that
ignorance by those elected (Somin, 2016).
Elite theory may be described using multiple contextual components that have
several related yet different meanings (Domhoff, 2010). Generally, elites may be those
individuals or groups in a society that hold status, power, money, or other interest(s) in a
greater quantity or strength than the rest of the population who are by necessity a
majority. Interestingly, it may be possible for nonelites like the newly wealthy to
overcome this neo-elite status and be assimilated into the traditional elites if offered the
proper tools and context from within which to do so.
Elite theory may best be understood as a flexible set of ideas capable of
integrating different components into an overarching theory. For example, elitism may be
used to describe characteristics of a democracy wherein the elite hold power but the
population are those who are able to influence political policy making. This democratic
example does not account for inherent differences among those making up the median.
Gilens and Page (2014) explained that political elite groups may be diverse and
include powerful special interest groups, lobbyists, Federal Advisory Committees (FAC),
as well as the wealthy (or economic elite). In their research study, the authors point out
that current views of the elite model include multiple elite sectors. While the most studied
and referred to sector is the political elite there are also sectoring of elites in the military,
religious, corporate, and other social environments (Gilens & Page, 2014). One may even
envision the elite structure of a grade school playground wherein a power hierarchy
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among the children plays out every day; one child is larger, one is more liked, another is
smarter, and another may share candy to effect influence. These sectors may interact,
compete, and influence one another at the elite levels of society.
Domhoff (2010) addressed these and other related issues in the example of a
generalizable link between government officials, their economic backgrounds, stature,
and distributed powers. Domhoff explored the FAC sector and its direct influence over
policy. It was suggested that while the public has virtually no policy influence; it is a
(mixed) theory of corporate, group, and individual elites that strongly influence policy
(Domhoff, 2010). The Gilans et al. (2014) study of economic elites indicated that where a
majority seeks to preserve the status quo of policy it is likely to be preserved. When a
majority seeks to change the policy status quo but it is opposed by the elites it is unlikely
to take place (Gilans, 2014).
The neo-elite models consist of integrations and cohesive agreements among elite
groups that can form into ‘elite settlements’ and the establishment of a new order (López,
2013). Settlements may also be created because of stressors on the elites by nonelites
over their interests (López, 2013). This is theorized to be the first step in elite
convergence wherein the elites come together forming a functional, united political
system (López, 2013). A failed example of this may be the United States’ attempt to
democratize Iraq. That effort may have failed in part because the Iraqi elites were not
able to realize this idealized formation.
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Social inputs from nonelite population such as uprisings and poverty may also
impact the elite function. The perception of social threat may be a necessary component
in the continuation of stable democracies because it may pressure elites to allow nonelite
input into the political system. That idea may also be applicable to elites’ tolerance levels
for poverty. Poverty in the population may be considered desirable for elites or not
desirable depending on the context and current prevailing social modeling of the involved
country. For example, poverty may be a positive attribute if considering social dominance
or providing cheap labor but may not be positive for preventing the spread of disease or
the mitigating the proliferation of violence and threats against the elite due to social
unrest or desire for social change.
While there may be competing interests between the elite and nonelite
populations, there does not appear to be a necessary divergence between the interests of
the two. There may be circumstances where the interests of both converge and be a
complementary goal of both groups like the desire for safety from nondomestic forces
taking over the homeland. However, these congruencies appear to be the result of
coincidental external circumstances and not a functional result of the theory itself.
Whether or not elite theory can be used to explain a population’s response to
government monitoring may be directly related to whether the population’s common
social structure values privacy and to what degree. Much of this chapter was dedicated to
understanding what privacy is and means. My research suggested that privacy may be
considered a strongly held ideal for many Americans. Defining that ideal however
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appears to be a concept that is curiously complex, nebulous, and difficult to define with
certainty. The ambiguity may result in part because privacy seems to be describable only
as it is being observed through different contextual lenses as outlined below.
Understanding Privacy
In his 1965 dissenting opinion penned under the Griswold v. Connecticut
Supreme Court case; Justice Black described the issue of privacy as a, “broad, abstract
and ambiguous concept” (Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. 479, 1965). Griswold
represents the first and most seminal in a line of cases establishing the legal notion of
privacy. Later cases continued to support the idea of legal protections of individual
privacy establishing a virtual ‘right’ to privacy; simultaneously opening windows through
which a judge’s pen could reach to carve out exceptions to that protection.
Right to Privacy
Traditionally, rights or quasi-rights like privacy may be thought of as being
created by legislation. But in practice they may actually grow outwardly from the judicial
system. It is the courts that offer individuals civil and criminal protections and it is the
courts that restrict personal actions; thus, defining how a nation will describe its social
boundaries. In the United States legal policy has historically supported a citizen’s ‘right’
to personal privacy. Individuals have had some protection from excessive government
intrusion and overreaching into their private life.
Interestingly, the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly guarantee a right to privacy
(U.S. Const.). To the extent that privacy is protected, the courts have established the
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protections through case law derived mainly from the 1st, 3rd, 4th 5th, and 14th
Constitutional Amendments. Privacy may be described as a somewhat flimsy and
contextually malleable socially constructed quasi-right expectation of law. This is an
important aspect of privacy because involuntary surveillance and the associated
violations of a perceived privacy protection may affect individual behavior.
In 2015, a University of Richmond Law Review article suggested that the mere
expectation of community surveillance is enough to affect the behavioral outcomes of
individuals (Kaminski, Margot, Witnov, & Shane, 2015). The paper provided a
comprehensive review of First Amendment theory in the context of both the historical
and modern decision making process. The authors highlighted potential censorship issues
connected to the conforming effects inherent in community behavior and group social
interactions (Kaminski, et al., 2015).
The study suggested that community conformance has a direct impact on how
policy is generated and how people decide social issues. Conformance fears may increase
anxiety levels in individuals that are undecided on specific issues. It may even change
closely held beliefs that are nonconforming resulting in cognitive dissonance within the
individuals (Kaminski, et al., 2015). Researchers identified knowledge or awareness of
privacy issues as a potential cause for changed perceptions and perceptions inside of a
physical community (like a neighborhood or social group), and play a role in altered
behavior.
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This chapter in my study describes privacy development over the past few
decades as it has been interpreted by the courts in physical, personal, and digital forms.
The march of technological progress has contributed to change by amplifying the
inherent push-pull of privacy and public safety. That continued tension is demonstrated
throughout the numerous privacy cases in the United States court system. The following
analysis of privacy related case law demonstrates the uncertain nature of privacy related
judicial outcomes and I discuss the categories that seem to frame the current legal review
of privacy.
Physical Privacy
Courts have used the subjective expectation of privacy of individuals targeted by
the government to define the limits of government intrusion (Smith v. Maryland, 1979); a
case involving the State’s use of a pen register to secretly record a defendant’s phone call
numbers. However, in Greenwood the court demarcated a limit to that expectation. The
Greenwood case compares a defendant’s individual notion of privacy to society’s
objective view of a legitimate expectation (California v. Greenwood, 1988).
In Greenwood, the court found that garbage placed at the curb of a suspect’s
residence does not meet the (narrower) societal expectation; effectively negating any 4 th
amendment claim from protecting the garbage bag’s contents. These criteria are
embodied in the ‘Katz test’. In Katz, the defendant was recorded by the federal
government while having ‘private’ conversations in a public telephone booth. The court
determined that such conversations were, in fact, private and thereafter created a privacy
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test consisting of two prongs. Under the test a defendant must demonstrate a subjective
expectation of privacy and the objective public must be willing to recognize that
expectation as legitimate (Katz., et al).
Expectations of privacy depend heavily on an individual’s privacy sensitivity
level. This level will temporarily rise (Farid, 2015), and specific civic behaviors can be
artificially changed when people are made aware that their activities are being monitored
(Panagopoulos, 2011). In response, some people choose to utilize anonymizing
technologies to insulate themselves from monitoring (Madden & Rainie, 2015); or they
may censor their actions entirely (Marthews & Tucker, 2014).
However, other studies suggest that a larger segment of the public does not care
about monitoring and that any level-increases diminish over time as people become
immune to a heightened surveillance environment (Oulasvirta, 2012). According to the
Pew Research Center, nearly half of U.S. citizens approve (or do not disapprove), of their
government monitoring private communications (PRC, 2013).
In 2015, an exploratory study of 30 cases were undertaken to determine whether
short term privacy sensitivity levels could be manipulated in people exposed to video
clips about privacy. The ‘treatment’ video clips were designed to inform the cases of the
importance of privacy, surveillance, protecting personal information, and new technology
(Farid, 2015). The control group was not exposed to the video clips about privacy and
both groups responded to questionnaires’ regarding privacy.
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The research demonstrated that neither group had an adequate understanding of
privacy or surveillance related issues. It was only after the treatment group watched
informative videos that their knowledge increased enough to understand the questions
regarding RFID and other technology inquiries. Statistical analysis of the data obtained
by Farid, 2015 revealed that exposure to the new information did significantly raise
privacy expectation levels and personal privacy concerns (at least temporarily), and that
women were disproportionately affected though the study did not offer a definitive reason
why (Farid, 2015). While the study did evidence immediate changes in perceptions it did
not comment specifically on whether those perceptions would result in changed behavior.
A 2011 study by Panagopoulos went beyond individual perceptions and
quantitatively examined large amounts of secondary data from an earlier 2008 analysis
(demonstrating that community voter turnout could be artificially manipulated by
informing community members that there voting activities were being monitored). The
study found that people are ‘highly reactive’ to information suggesting their community
would know whether they voted; and noted that the size of the community was not a
significant predictor of the behavior change (Panagopoulos, 2011).
The Panagopoulos study suggested that social pressure and the desire to exhibit
community compliant social behavior occurs when people are confronted with concrete
information that they’re behavior is not only monitored but reported and would be shared
with other community members. The behavior change will occur from the mere ‘threat’
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of surveillance and exposure of non-conforming behaviors as the experiment offered no
evidence that the people were actually being reported (Panagopoulos, 2011).
Based on federal cases like the 1991 U.S. v. Penny-Feeney decision, one would
suspect that the Supreme Court of the United States decision penned a decade later in the
2001 Kyllo case would have protected the privacy of a defendant (against such things as
the use of heat-sensing Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) by law enforcement). However,
in Penny-Feeney, the district court upheld the use of FLIR by law enforcement (without a
warrant), explaining that defendants did not demonstrate a subjective expectation of
privacy regarding the “heat waste” they created, nor did they attempt to exercise
dominion over the waste preventing it from venting to the public.
With the notable exception of Kyllo, the courts generally continue to view FLIR
as a constitutionally acceptable method of warrantless surveillance by the government.
Kyllo appears to have supported States rights’ instead of following the federally
established history of cases. In 2001 Justice Scalia and the Kyllo majority opined that a
FLIR device used by police to identify a hotter than usual house effectively explored the
intimate details inside a private home; something normally requiring physical intrusion
and therefore a warrant. Scalia wrote that, “to withdraw protection of this minimum
expectation would be to permit police technology to erode the privacy guaranteed by the
Fourth Amendment”. The minority noted that there should be a distinction between
through the wall and off wall surveillance, arguing that through the wall is intrusive by
nature.

28
The Eleventh Circuit court in United States v. Ford attempted to remedy this
seeming inconsistency by determining that, “the thermal imagery at issue here appears to
be of such low resolution as to render it incapable of revealing the intimacy of detail and
activity protected by the Fourth Amendment”, U.S. v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992 (1994). FLIR
technology has advanced since that opinion and is now very detailed.
The court in both Myers and Pinson agreed that a FLIR device is passive and nonintrusive. It does not intrude in any way into the privacy and sanctity of the home and that
it operates by sampling the thermal waste given off by a structure without requiring
beams or rays or any other penetration into the structure. This is very similar to the
court’s interpretation of airspace above a residence. Airspace has been viewed by the
courts as publicly assessable and not within the protections of the 4th amendment, thereby
upholding law enforcement’s right to surveillance of properties from private aircraft
without a warrant. It is like the ‘open field’ theory as outlined by Hester v. United States,
265 U.S. 57 (1924). Hester stands for the legal principle that an individual may not
(legitimately) expect privacy outside the home except in areas immediately adjacent to
the structure, even if they are on private property.
Individual Privacy
Privacy as an expansive protection extending beyond the 4th Amendment
provisions of one’s home was expanded to include the actual individual. Over time, this
idea has broadened to include aspects of the individual like reputation, intellectual
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products, and spiritual nature. Privacy of the individual may be important because people
may alter their behavior when they demonstrate concern over surveillance-risk levels.
A study was undertaken to analyze a finite community of high-risk individuals
following the events of September 11, 2001. The study was framed around the legal
holding in the Heart of Atlanta Motel court case; one of the leading cases to address race
issues and the exclusion of a specific race from accessing an otherwise public resource.
This study was designed to parallel the experiences of the Sikhs in America following
9/11; most of who refrained from air travel, and self-imposed travel restrictions to avoid
embarrassment for some period.
The study analyzed the post 9/11 Internet behavior of over three hundred (311)
Muslim-Americans. Results suggested that among a minority of individuals who
indicated that they believed their Internet use was being monitored only a very small
percentage took actions to mitigate it (Sidhu, 2007). Some behavior change was
observed, but not at a significant level. What explains this seemingly contradictory
result? Could it be attributed to the surveillance source that was monitoring the
community? Could it be due to a six-year ‘acceptance’ period following 9/11? Is there a
relationship between short term perception and long term behavioral changes linked to
knowledge of surveillance?
A study by Oulasvirta suggested that humans will adapt to long-term surveillance
whether they want to or not. In 2012, 10 households participated in a 6 month
longitudinal observation focused on analyzing the perceptions and behaviors of
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individuals affirmatively opposed to monitoring (Oulasvirta, 2012). The study consisted
of invasive in-home camera monitoring of the households and was based on a theory of
Social Identity. That result suggested that an individual’s level of surveillance tolerance
depends on the surveillance source – in favor of a shared identity (Oulasvirta, 2012). For
example, people may be likely to share information (even very sensitive information),
about their personal life on Facebook or Twitter because they have a shared identity with
those ‘friends’ in the social community they are connected to. They may be far less likely
to voluntarily share that same information with people outside that pre-selected friend
community.
The Oulasvirta study demonstrated that the anxiety levels of the participants
decreased with time even though the surveillance level and invasive camera monitoring
did not. The only departures from the result occurred when participants had to explain the
cameras and monitoring equipment to household visitors or guests not aware of the study.
This was attributed to the dissonance created in the minds of the study participants when
visitors were not accepting or not understanding of the experiment (Oulasvirta, 2012).
This again appears to confirm that community social acceptance plays a very important
role in surveillance tolerance levels.
While many of the characteristics of individual privacy perception and personalspace expectation contain amorphous and flexible components, an individual’s DNA is
arguably the most intimate and unchanging. Presumably, intrusions into this sacred
domain would be the last to be relinquished through population acceptance. In June 2013
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the U.S. Supreme Court decided a case, Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 133 S. Ct.
1958, 186 L.Ed.2d 1 (2013). The court held that the defendant’s cheek swab was a minor
(and brief), intrusion on privacy and that the warrantless collection of saliva DNA was
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The majority equated obtaining a suspect’s
DNA with other standard tasks of the post-arrest pre-conviction ‘booking’ procedure like
photographing or fingerprinting a suspect.
Conversely, the case of drawing blood from a suspect (specifically following a
DWI), is quite the opposite. In McNeely the court determined that when an officer can
reasonably obtain a warrant for blood draw they must do so, in keeping with the 4th
amendment protections of an individuals’ right to be free from unreasonable searches
(Missouri v. McNeely, 2014). It should be noted that live blood draws for the purpose of
law enforcement are held in different regard than the retrieval of dried blood from under
a suspect’s fingertips. The Supreme Court of the United States earlier held in Cupp v.
Murphy that dried blood was essentially evanescent evidence and that a suspect could
begin to remove it from his hands before police had a chance to obtain a warrant to
preserve it (Cupp v. Murphy, 1973). The McNeely court found a blood draw to be an
unreasonable search because there were no legitimate circumstances present that would
constitute an exception to the requirement for a warrant, unlike Schmerber where there
was a legitimate exception (Schmerber v. California, 1966).
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Data Privacy
The privacy of an individual’s blood or DNA has been addressed by the courts for
several decades. However, the legal system has only recently begun to address the
complexity of issues involved in defining the extent of privacy with respect to one’s
personal digital data. This may be due in large part to the relatively recent developments
in technology and a lagging court response to emerging technological issues combined
with the absence of traditional caselaw. Although courts may grapple with the application
of new developments in technology every day, issues specific to privacy are particularly
difficult to navigate due to the required balancing of personal interest in privacy with the
State’s interest in security.
The government’s ability to utilize personal data inferentially poses additional
unique issues; most notably with error. An example from everyday life is easily
imagined. An individual’s grocery shopping habits are often preserved in digital form
through the ubiquitous use of membership and loyalty cards. These digital data records
may demonstrate purchases of large quantities of fatty foods every week.
Inferential analysis of the data could suggest that the purchaser is at a higher risk
of health issues (high cholesterol, high blood pressure, or diabetes), and therefore could
be subject to higher health insurance premiums; or at least continuous more invasive long
term monitoring. What the individualized data points do not demonstrate is that while the
shopper is buying the fatty foods the food is actually being fed to highly specialized sled
dogs that require a high fat diet. This simple example demonstrates that a known
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interrelationship among data points is required to avoid error and make accurate
assessments. Merely having access to data is far more complex than it may initially
appear and could result in very unfavorable consequences by government actors.
It is this kind of potential for error that can occur when law enforcement seeks to
access an individual’s cell phone data. As the Riley v. California (2014) court stated:
“[c]ellphones have become important tools in facilitating coordination and
communication among members of criminal enterprises that can provide valuable
incriminating information about dangerous criminal – [p]rivacy comes at a cost”. The
Riley court upheld (at least in part), individual privacy rights when it comes to data stored
on a cell phone. The court indicated that while a search of the physical aspects of a
cellphone are immune from the warrant requirement; the information stored in a cell
phone generally does require a warrant to access.
Law enforcement may not without a warrant search the data on a cell phone
seized from an arrestee (excluding longstanding exceptions to warrantless searches under
the 4th amendment like exigent circumstances). Supporting this rule a warrant can often
be obtained digitally within minutes of law enforcement’s request using real-time
interconnected technologies. Data on a cell phone can easily be preserved indefinitely by
simply shutting the phone off or removing its battery. The exigent circumstances
exception may be used to negate the rule where circumstances reasonably require it. This
relatively new ‘cellphone rule’ contrasts the usual probable cause searches that have been
found to be reasonable when incident to a lawful arrest (Chimel v. California, 1969).

34
Digital data in its hard form (on the computer or hardware storage device), can be
also be searched by the government under several warrantless conditions including the
usual plain view, consent, and exigent circumstance exceptions. Border crossings and the
border crossing exception (see 19 C.F.R. 162.6; authorizing warrantless searches of
electronic devices at the border), offer yet another loophole in the requirement for a
warrant to obtain a person’s electronic data; this with potential ‘soft data’ implications.
The border exception began with the diminishment of an individual’s expectation
of privacy in an automobile. Courts have consistently held that drivers may be stopped at
border crossings into the U.S. and their vehicle contents searched without a warrant or
probable cause (Terry v. Ohio, 1968). Border searches may be made in the absence of
any individualized suspicion at border checkpoints within reasonably geographical
boundaries (United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 1976), (Carroll v. United States, 1925). It
is now well established that border authorities may search computers and digital storage
devices without the usual need for a warrant or even probably cause; this is a blanket
exception that includes all international airports.
Access to and utilization of an individual’s personal digital data regardless of its
mechanism of acquisition can lead to substantial inferential errors. While access to
multiple points of data can serve to mitigate this compartmentalization issue, aggregating
data points can create different but equally important privacy issues.
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Public Privacy
The courts have consistently upheld the notion that relatively minor augmentation
of standard policing does not change the nature of the acquired information which itself
may or may not be protected by privacy provisions. One persuasive line of cases in
support of personal privacy derives from the court’s mosaic theory.
The mosaic reasoning was exercised by the United States Supreme Court in U.S.
v. Jones, (2012). The that while individuals relinquish their expectation of privacy by
disclosing information publicly (under the Third-Party Doctrine and Public Disclosure
Doctrines), that information cannot be used ‘in the aggregate’ by law enforcement
because it has the potential to disclose far more personal information than the target
would otherwise reasonably believe (Rosenzweig, 2017).
The theory was specifically applicable in a case where a law enforcement target’s
car was tracked over the course of several months. While the travel route of the car was
public and therefore immune from 4th amendment protection, the travel routes of the car
over the course of multiple months was not. It is not reasonable that the travel routes of a
person over such a long course of time would be considered available to the public unless
the person was being targeted (U.S. v. Jones, 2012). The 4th amendment argument
regarding Mosaic theory may also be seen in the 2018 case Carpenter v. United States,
(2018). The court indicated that individuals have an expectation of privacy in the
government tracking their movements over a period of time. In that case Carpenter
argued that cell phone signal data required a warrant and not merely a court order to
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access. The majority court based its reasoning on a reasonable expectation of privacy,
while a dissenting opinion believed the 4th amendment argument was better supported by
a protection of personal property or location data (Carpenter v. U.S., 2018).
In either instance, an aggregate of information could tell law enforcement much
more about a target than a public location alone, developing into evidence of personal,
‘intimate’ actions or associations that could be protected by the 4th amendment. One of
the notable problems for the mosaic theory is the indefinable nature from which the idea
derives. That is, what is a reasonable amount of surveillance or how much surveillance is
required before it jumps the hurdle of improper aggregation. In Carpenter, it was argued
that 24 hours was the line that should not be crossed (Carpenter v. United States, 2018),
but the question was left undefined may allow courts to make individual assessments and
case outcomes become unpredictable.
The government has utilized Mosaic theory referencing national security concerns
in defense of non-transparency and the refusal to release otherwise non-sensitive
information (Pozen, 2005). The label of Mosaic as applied by the Court and government
was later developed into a working theory by Pozen and is now widely accepted and used
to describe a variety of situations where aggregated data may be formed into something
greater than the individual data (Pozen, 2005).
One question arising from this scenario (in the context of digital data), is directly
related to application of the Third-Party Rule. During normal daily activities data is
knowingly relinquished from computers to third-party traffic handling systems, mass data
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storage units, and Internet Service Providers (ISPs). This is the case for all Internet users
including those who utilize email, social networking, or even so-called private websites.
Like short car trips, limited social network data may reveal only a small amount
of public information; but large amounts of data (like car trips added up over the course
of several months), can reveal very private or intimate information about an individual
such that an entire character profile may be developed. Theories of aggregation of mass
surveillance data like Mosaic leave open questions regarding levels of intimacy,
relationship characteristics, and how what levels of privacy protection they should be
afforded in email, Internet searches, or social media connections.
The potential issues associated with third party aggregation of surveillance data
are easily understood. Suppose Mary, an individual on the phone with her friend Bob
(who is on holiday in a country with limited Internet access), uses a search engine to look
up information on a particularly unpleasant sexually transmitted disease. This is done so
that relevant medical information could be relayed to Bob who is working abroad and
does not have adequate Internet access to do the research himself. Mary’s research
(captured and stored by the search engine), may later be combined with a digital receipt
for antibiotics (purchased by her daughter at the local pharmacy using her mom’s
discount card), may lead an analyst to the misguided conclusion that Mary has a sexually
transmitted disease. In fact, she did not. Although multiple data points and references
were used in the assessment, the inference was not aligned in context and would not yield
an accurate assessment because the data were not in context.
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These examples begin to shed light on why defining privacy limitations and
protections is so important. Many law-abiding citizens may be tempted to advocate for a
version of privacy best described as ‘when one has nothing to hide, one requires only a
minimum level of privacy’. If privacy is required at all it can exist where it is not
requiring complete segmentation from the government.
However, the more informed scholar may see that privacy is not necessarily a veil
behind which evil must per se be taking place. Rather, it is better described as a
protective barrier that exists between an individual and their government. It is necessary
to prevent tyranny, mistake, poor decision-making or policy implementation based on
inaccurate or incomplete data obtained from invaded portions of one’s life (Solove,
2018).
Surveillance
Historically, no discussion of surveillance and privacy would be complete without
discussion of Bentham’s theoretical Panopticon (Semple, 1993). The Panopticon may be
described as an architectural design that envisioned a penal building designed to facilitate
persistent monitoring of inmates. It utilized a tall central structure surrounded by multiple
levels of pie-shaped circular cells, each with a window at their outermost side. The
window would illuminate the cells with outside light but the center viewing structure
would remain dark. The monitoring agent would be able to view all the inmates, but the
inmates would not be able to see the monitor.
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The effect produced inmates who would not know when they were being watched
but that they could be watched at any or all times. In theory, the result of this structure
may be a (prison) population that will alter their behavior always in conformance with
prison regulations to avoid punishment because there is no way for an inmate to predict
when they are being monitored. The assumptions supporting panopticon monitoring may
parallel the unseen mass surveillance programs used by the government. The government
could watch the population but the population is unable to see it watching.
I was unable to identify research analyzing the impact of one way mass
surveillance programs on society in the context of privacy. This may have been due in
part to the relatively recent introduction of social media as a tool of mass surveillance for
large populations or it may be attributed to the relative lack of conscious awareness of
surveillance programs by the public prior to 2013. My research offered some insight into
these programs and the associated public policies impacts they may have on society.
Personal privacy may mean the protection of individual data or metadata so that
they do not become susceptible to abuse, misuse, or contextual misunderstanding. One
primary area of privacy concern that my research identified was the proliferation of
government surveillance powers as counterpoise to an individuals’ right to be let alone
and be free from excessive government interference (Warren & Brandeis, 1890).
However, the ability of the government to monitor and track elements of its population is
central to civil administration and governance. Monahan commented that an
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understanding of surveillance is a required function to, [order] society through the
regulation of individual or group behavior (Jing, 2016).
Government surveillance of citizens is to some degree not defined only by the
monitoring of criminal activity or preventing nefarious activities (although one would be
hard pressed to argue that some level of surveillance is required to prevent complex
criminal enterprises from overtaking society). Nor is government surveillance necessarily
as ominous or Orwellian as some have depicted it (see Orwell, 1949). Governments have
a legitimate interest in even the most democratic of constructs, in monitoring their
citizens for public health disease outbreaks, social order disruptions, infrastructure needs,
education compliance, and many other nontotalitarian oversight requirements. Society
has an interest in allowing legitimate government surveillance for the same reasons.
Society to a large degree may coexist within an intrusive government surveillance
environment due in part to a phenomenon called acceptance. Bauman’s 2014 study
explained the phenomenon of acceptance in two ways (Bauman, 2014). The 2013
discovery of the government’s bulk data collection activities may have surprised the
public. However, with the passage of time a phenomenon called ‘familiarization’ occurs.
When individuals are exposed to a shocking event, they will over time, become less
shocked and increasingly desensitized to it. The pervasive and ubiquitous nature of
surveillance has over time desensitized U.S. society (Bauman, 2014).
Second, individuals in a Web 2.0+ environment of interactivity experience daily
social surveillance or peer to peer lateral surveillance between community members. The
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idea of monitoring friends and family throughout the day through Facebook or a Twitter
feed may be framed as fun and engaging (Bauman et al., 2014). Over time the idea of
surveillance as a fun activity overrides the discussion and detracts from the more formal
characteristics of surveillance. People may come to expect to be monitored by their social
communities and even craft their personal appearance accordingly.
Mass Monitoring Programs
Following the June 2013 release of top-secret documents by former NSA
contractor and whistle blower Edward Snowden the United States public became aware
that their government was spying on them and acquiring vast quantities of personal data
through covert monitoring programs. These programs utilized third-party data collection
techniques to obtain private information on virtually everyone in the United States. The
programs were based on the use of secret agreements between government spy agencies
and private companies, corporate proxies, search engines, as well as Web 2.0 social
media platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and Skype (Electronic Frontier Foundation,
2020).
Much of the literature commenting on the event and that comments on these
programs include references to the, “privacy – security” spectrum; aka the tension
inherent between civil liberties, individual security, and the scope of power required by
the government to achieve a specific level of safety. The privacy – security spectrum may
be described as a spread or range of amplitudes that define quantities of both ideas. There
is no reasonable way to approach privacy as a binary issue wherein there is not a middle
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ground. The spectrum represents on one side the private individual and on the opposing
side the governmental interest in national security that is supposed to require monitoring
and oversight.
The field occupying the spread of space between the two end-points represents
either an increase or decrease of civil protections afforded to individuals. It is important
to note that the spectrum does not represent an actual level of safety afforded the
individual; that relationship would be illustrated by a “privacy – safety” spectrum and
that field is different. That would measure the subjective safety of an individual against
the increasing or decreasing civil protections afforded that individual. Neither of these
spectrums demonstrates a quantifiable objective measure of security, but simply
illuminates a relative level of safety when compared against a loss of civil liberties.
To many outside the counterterrorism contingent a policy issue post-September
11, 2001 may be striking a balance between security and privacy. Previous studies
suggest a correlation between perceived increases in (personal) threats and the
willingness of individuals to relinquish privacy or civil liberties (Davis & Silver, 2004).
Whether there is a relationship between the variables or where they intercept(s) on a
graphed-curve of security, safety, and privacy may require additional analysis and may
not be a foregone assumption. Increased surveillance (decreased privacy), and a safer
society may not be a known, definable, or accepted relationship. If such a relationship
does exist it may not be assumed that the relationship is necessarily either inverse or
proportional.
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Perhaps the most prolific examples commenting on the privacy security spectrum
in existing literature are related to the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, (USA
PATRIOT ACT, 2001), and its progeny. Following the terrorist attacks on the United
State occurring on 9/11/2001, the Act was officially enacted to protect the American
public from further terrorist activities (USA PATRIOT ACT, 2001). However, it soon
became clear to outside observers that the legislation was operationally designed to
circumvent established legal protections by allowing domestic spying of citizens using
police powers not intended by the drafters of the United States Constitution by
eliminating checks and balances previously reserved for the judicial branch (Electronic
Frontier Foundation, 2020).
The PATRIOT ACT was pass in record time and was a powerful expansion of
prior existing legislation allowing the National Security Agency (NSA), to intercept
suspect communication but also allowed the agency to listen in on unrelated parties
connected with that communication (American Civil Liberties Union, 2020). Among
several problematic sections of the Act was Section 203. The section provided law
enforcement with among other things, broad abilities to intercept massive amounts of
electronic communication and data greatly enhancing the government’s ability to share
information both inter-agency and extra-agency through the expanded use of intelligence
Fusion Centers.
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Several follow-up or related legislative actions broadened the Act’s powers
causing public interest and civil rights advocacy groups to voice concern regarding the
expansive nature of the new laws. These included Total Information Awareness Program
(TIA), the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA),
expansion of pre-existing ECPA and FISA, the National Security Letter (NSL) laws, and
others (NSL, n.d.). In its wake, Washington created dozens of new intelligence groups,
agencies and sub-agencies including the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
(ODNI, n.d.).
As time passed in the post 9/11 environment, enhanced ‘security’ at the expense
of civil liberties progressed beyond electronic intercepts and began to include invasive
body scans at airports and other physical intrusions. It wasn’t until Edward Snowden
leaked classified information that the U.S. public became aware of the actual nature and
extent of the domestic surveillance that the government was undertaking. Snowden
disclosed information on the government’s mass population data collection programs (not
unlike the less technically sophisticated COINTELPRO of the 1970s), and data mining
programs Xkeyscore, Quantuminsert, Bullrun, Dishﬁre, and one codenamed PRISM. The
PRISM program allowed government agents to retain and sort vast amounts of citizendata by contracting with telecommunications and Internet Service Providers.
Snowden also disclosed information about the top-secret government program
codenamed UPSTREAM. This program along with Quantuminsert, tapped into
transatlantic sub-sea fiber cables to intercept virtually all incoming and outgoing Internet
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communications. The program was authorized under Section 702 of the 2008 Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA); all without a warrant or informing individuals they
were being monitored.
In 2014 a quantitative study looked at whether the Snowden event triggered
changes in Internet use. Using Internet search data derived from hundreds of common
keywords compiled from the Google search engine the study examined whether people
modified their Internet search keyword behavior immediately following Edward
Snowden’s 2013 release of top-secret information regarding domestic government
surveillance. The study design utilized keyword assignments to one of three (3)
categories ranging from ‘less private’ to ‘more private’ or ‘sensitive’. The keywords
ranged from personal disease inquiries to questions about the CIA or other overtly
sensitive government issues (Marthews & Tucker, 2017).
The study found that search word usage following the 2013 Snowden event
(assigned to the high-sensitivity category), fell by ten (10) percent (Marthews et al.,
2017). This means that for every ten (10) searches done prior to the Snowden event only
nine (9) were done after it. While not a large change per se the study found that the
change was statistically significant. The study authors suggested that the result had the
potential to influence international commerce as people may stop using U.S. search
engines do to fear of loss of privacy (Marthews, et al., 2017).
This paper reviewed information obtained from legal cases, academic journals,
research and dissertation database papers, peer reviewed social science articles, and
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public information sources published in years 2011 through 2016. A few resources
outside the traditional five-year publication window will also be included to present
relevant information in an accurate historical context.
The Walden University library research databases ProQuest and EBSCOhost will
be used to access many of these sources. Electronic search terms entered in to those
databases include privacy, privacy defined, elite theory, classical elite theory, 9/11, post9/11, USA PATRIOT ACT, Snowden, privacy perceptions, government monitoring,
Total Information Awareness (TIA), The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),
and big brother. While additional sources are analyzed to ensure a broad understanding of
the subject matter, many will be intentionally excluded because they are deemed to be
redundant, outside the scope of the study, or non-conforming to the inclusion protocol.
Ultimately, the literature review will provide the reader with a solid foundation from
which to understand the research material and overarching theory presented in the study.
Summary
My research suggested that many Americans consider privacy and security to be
an important aspect of their personal life. Those views may translate into emotional and
sometimes negative reactions when new social policy affecting their privacy is proposed.
However, a review of literature and an analysis of the emergent themes discussing these
phenomena revealed that many individuals may not understand what privacy is or how
privacy doctrines apply in everyday life.
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My review of available literature did not find information addressing the potential
application of elite theory to national security and privacy policy. This highlighted an
area of study that may not be readily available to policy creators who are trying to avoid
unwanted collateral policy outcomes like social disruption or noncompliance.
The elite theory social construct may prove to be significant to the understanding
of how society will respond to a given change in public policy. By using secondary data
and thematic analysis techniques my study inquired whether elite theory could be utilized
by policy professionals to suggest social outcomes prior to policy implementation. The
implications for policy professional are potentially far reaching and may apply to social
change across a broad spectrum of individuals. Policy modeling tools may be used to
shape policy without the requirement of social discourse and could potentially be used to
bypass the normative democratic structure of decision making.
This study evaluated the different types of privacy, described how privacy is
defined in America, and analyzed the relationships required to maintain an effective
partition of privacy between the state and the population. I then identified the threshold
associated with overcoming that partition and identified the point at which individuals
will shape their behavior around changes in privacy perceptions.
This research may have applicability to national security policy involving privacy,
population monitoring, or data gathering. It may also extend into collateral areas of social
policy like the use of advanced interrogation techniques or offsite detention facilities. The
result of the research may be relevant to the drafting and implementation of nearly all
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future domestic security policies and could offer policy professionals more freedom as
they endeavor to balance the needs of the government against the responsibilities of an
inclusive democracy.
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Chapter 3: Methodology
In this chapter I discussed the methodological approach used to address a missing
area of literature pertaining to the use of elite theory in security and privacy policy
analysis and addressed whether elite theory may be used as an analytical component
when drafting national security policy. The research examined the potential relationship
between the United States government’s domestic eavesdropping programs and the
public interest of protecting individual privacy.
The purpose of the study was to test the hypothesis that elite theory can be applied
in an assessment of how a population will behave in response to privacy intrusions by the
government. The theory suggests that a nonelite population is generally apathetic to
security policy and is largely devoid of sustained investment in the protection of
individual privacy rights (Pareto, 1935). This research was undertaken to assist national
level policy makers, analysts, and academics in their understanding of elite theory as a
tool of modern policy development.
To be effective, the post-9/11 national security posture of the United States
required increasing quantities of highly detailed intelligence obtained at the cost of
individual privacy (American Civil Liberties Union, 2020). As such, it may be reasoned
that national security policy accounted for the social impact created from the acquisition
of that intelligence. If elite theory can suggest behavior than policy creators may be free
to disregard the voices of the non-elite, focusing instead on aggressive intelligence
gathering methods.
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This chapter addressed the primary research question, methodology rationale,
theoretical approach, threats to validity, ethical considerations, and overall study design. I
discussed secondary data analysis of the relationship between privacy (in a pre-Snowden
environment), and variations present in a post-Snowden enhanced monitoring
environment. The acquisition and use of secondary data as well as statistical research
tools utilized in the analysis were also explained. Finally, the possible dissemination and
future use of the resultant research was addressed.
Research Questions and Design
This study was designed to examine the relationship between domestic
government surveillance programs (an independent variable) and changes in individual
privacy behavior (a dependent variable). I investigated whether elite theory may be used
as a tool to assist with policy decision making. My review other research studies
established this nonexperimental correlational analysis using archival data. The study is
informed by thematic analysis of carefully selected topical sources. The research question
and testable hypothesis are as follows:
RQ1: Using prior studies and secondary data; what is the nature of the
relationship among the independent variable (domestic government spying), and the
dependent variable (individual privacy behavior)?
H01: There is a relationship between the independent variable (domestic
government spying), and the dependent variable (individual privacy behavior).
Domestic government surveillance will affect individual behavior.
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Ha1: There is no relationship between the independent variable (domestic
government spying), and the dependent variable (individual privacy behavior).
Domestic government surveillance will not affect individual behavior in a
significant manner.
Using a thematic analysis of existing research offers a unique perspective of
aggregated data not available to the original individual researcher (Braun & Clark, 2008).
Thematic analysis offers broad access to a wide variety of data that would not otherwise
be obtainable considering financial and logistical constraints, while at the same time
offering a more concise evaluation of the research question (Braun & Clark, 2008). This
study was undertaken to analyze prior study outcomes and identify previously
undiscovered relationships. The thematic analysis of multiple existing study results is
used to inform my analysis of secondary data from pre-existing archived data sets. The
data will provide increased assessment capabilities and offer significant advantages over
single-slice data acquisition techniques.
Methodology
While both the thematic and secondary data analysis techniques selected for this
research offer advantages there are several challenges that were addressed. First, because
there was a degree of freedom to choose data that was used in the secondary study, I was
aware of the potential of introducing selection bias. I took care in not purposefully
selecting data that supported the hypothesis. Second, I was aware that the data obtained
from secondary sources could have come prepackaged with interpretations of that data
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and those could have been transferred to my study so I was careful to avoid that. Third,
the internal validity of the secondary data relied on an outside source (Pew’s research
methods and safeguards), and not one specifically designed by me. I independently
analyzed and verified that their research design met the same criteria I would have used
to acquire the secondary data as my own primary data and was satisfied that it did. Even
with these challenges (common to both the secondary data analysis and thematic analysis
methods), the analysis tools I used provided a solid methodology for discovering new
patterns and relationships. Each of the challenges were mitigated with solid research
technique combined with careful attention to detail and the awareness of and elimination
of potential bias.
A comprehensive synthesis of the secondary data with results obtained from the
thematic analysis provided a robust understanding of population sentiment relating to
domestic government surveillance and individual privacy. The research offers insight into
the viability of elite theory as a predictive tool in the context of national security policy
creation.
Modern social science offers two primary methodological research design
approaches: quantitative and qualitative. Both offer advantages and disadvantages
depending on the type of data used, data characteristics, and the research outcome that is
preferred. Both methods are useful to explain phenomena but approach the explanation
from different perspectives.
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Qualitative analysis uses an inductive methodology to explain an observable
behavior or condition through a subjective lens (Suter, 2012). Data acquisition is largely
exploratory and may be obtained several different ways including through the descriptive
life experiences of subjects (Suter, 2012). The goal of qualitative research design is to
record and explain lived experiences (from which inferences may later be drawn about
larger populations), and to explore and understand how phenomena unfold (Suter, 2012).
Data is not number based and can include narratives, pictures, objects, or observations.
This qualitative approach offers significant flexibility allowing it to change as the study
progresses (Suter, 2012). A qualitative design is best suited for use in the investigatory
phase of understanding new a phenomenon or for understanding the deeper social
meaning behind an event (Suter, 2012).
Quantitative analysis is an objective, structured methodology that allows a
researcher to numerically analyze statistically significant attributes obtained from a
representative sample of the population (Creswell, 2003). The deductive design of a
quantitative methodology affords high external validity, is objective, deductive, and relies
on an experiment-based framework to validate a theory or confirm a hypothesis
(Creswell, 2003). Quantitative analysis uses structured data to examine any correlational
relationship between two variables (Mertler, 2018). Because results are replicable and
there is an inherent cause and effect involved in this type of analysis, the result may often
be used to support predictions (Mertler, 2018).
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One characteristic of a quantitative study is the high level of external validity
(Creswell, 2003). This refers to the ability of the study to be later generalized to a larger
population. In quantitative research, external validity is high because the design
inherently eliminates outside variables and external factors (Flick, 2017). For example, in
my study the data are preexisting and will remain accessible to other researchers who
may replicate the experiment in the future while still obtaining the same result.
A quantitative approach was best for this study because it solidly aligns with both
the research question and hypothesis test. The structured data can be easily understood
through numerical analysis and the results applied to a large population. Study data was
analyzed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software Version
23, and the analysis will be informed by the results of the metadata.
Data Selection
Data was obtained from applicable English-only key word and phrase searches
included in years 2011 through 2016. The searches were conducted using the Walden
University Dissertation Database, Walden University online library, ProQuest research
databases, Pew research databases, and Google Scholar. Search inquiries offered several
thousand results; a small percentage of which are in alignment with the study. These were
meticulously synthesized and compared against pre-established inclusion criteria. The
selected scholarly works strongly aligned with the study goals. This reflects the effort to
include content-appropriate articles in the analysis.
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Following an evaluation of potential nationwide data sources, the data sets in this
study derived from the Pew Research databases. Pew is a nonprofit, nonpartisan and nonadvocacy facts tank that values objectivity, accuracy, and rigor; and is committed to
impartial research and data (Pew, 2020). The foundation conducts public opinion polling,
demographic research, content analysis and other data-driven social science research.
Pew’s mission is to inform the public about the issues, attitudes and trends shaping
America and the world (Pew, 2020). Table 1 shows the databases and information that
were selected from ninety possible sets that are available from Pew:
Table 1
Data Analysis—PEW Datasets

Date Range

Database

N

2006

12/01 – 12/30

Digital Footprints

3379

2013

5-Jun

Snowden Leak

x

2013

07/01 – 07/30

Anonymity

1002

2013

08/07 – 09/16

Connectivity

1801

2014

01/10 – 01/27

Privacy Panel (1)

607

2014

08/05 – 09/02

Privacy Panel (2)

498

2014-2015

11/26 – 01/03

Privacy Panel (3)

475

2015

01/27 – 02/16

Privacy Panel (4)

461
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Pew’s Social and Demographic database as well as its Internet, Science, and
Technology database content provided a high level of applicability to my research
question. Using more than one data set may increase the number of available data points
within a specified frame of time that contrasts with the single-slice data capture
technique. While both single-slice and multiset options have merit depending on the
specific application that a researcher desires; the latter may offer more robust capture
opportunities for this study. It also may account for sentiment change over time, mitigate
potential bias created from news of current events, and provide a larger statistical pool
from which to draw inferences and it is for these reasons that I selected this method for
the study.
Each data set was individually analyzed using key word, key phrase, and subject
matter matching, ensuring that the content parallels the framework of the study. Content
matches included technological connectivity, surveillance issues, social media use,
mainstream media awareness, personal anonymity, communication behavior, social
interactives, and community involvement.
While the diversity of the Pew research data provided a solid survey of national
privacy perceptions, there were limitations. Sampling errors (the difference between the
value derived from the population sample and the actual value associated with the entire
population), can occur in any of the data sets (Dodge, 2005). Similarly, survey bias can
occur when there is a difference between the surveyed population (sample), and the
whole population (Stat Trek, 2020). Subpopulations within the sample can be overlooked,
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excluded, or their characteristics not properly accounted for (Stat Trek, 2020). For
example, the inclusion of survey answers from a retired law enforcement officer may
skew the data obtained; the officer is a member of a subpopulation exhibiting attributes or
weight that may not have been properly accounted for (when compared with the
population).
While the Pew research data in this study already existed, it was not immune from
self-reporting limitations. Respondents may have unintentionally report false answers,
exaggerated, or even lied. Additionally, the collection methods used required respondents
to provide responses using a limited number of feedback options. These may not have
adequately reflect more complex scenarios thus yielding responses of limited usefulness.
Data for the study was originally obtained between the year 2013 and 2016. Data
obtained before 2013 was generally be excluded from the study because of a limited need
for information prior to the Snowden surveillance data dump.
Data Analysis
Analysis was accomplished by assigning government surveillance monitoring
programs as an independent variable and an individual’s privacy behavior as a dependent
variable in the observational model. The model was designed to identify any relationship
between the variables and to examine descriptive and thematic patterns if they existed.
Thematic Analysis
A thematic analysis, the examination and synthesis of aggregated information
obtained from more than one previously completed study from which themes emerge, are
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identified and extracted (Flick, 2017), was chosen to provide a more robust and accurate
result than a single study analysis may have. I applied the thematic analysis inclusion
criteria across multiple topical research papers to inform the correlational study of the
Pew research data in this study.
The emergence of thematic inclusion criteria for the research identified in the
literature review section of Chapter 2 included determinations of relevancy of the
research inquiry, relevancy of the data, publication date, and peer review status. Studies
were selected for inclusion in the analysis if they addressed the issue(s) of right to
privacy, government monitoring, changes in privacy behavior, or individual privacy
perceptions, and would contribute to an overall understanding of the research problem.
These suggested a strong relationship between an individual’s perception of a
terrorism threat and a level of acquiesces to the loss of specific civil liberties. They also
suggested that both perceptual and behavioral alterations were observed in protective
behavior after the Snowden information dump. The behavior data provided useful
information but relied on self-reporting. Results may have been generated by sample
populations that were potentially influenced by skewing factors like priming bias,
suggestion bias, or the Hawthorne effect. This is not necessarily a reflection of deficient
study methodology as some limitations are an inherent function of data collection
surveys; nonetheless they may fail to provide an ideal tool for policy analysis.
This study was designed to mitigate the limitations associated with single-slice
survey timing and survey bias by reporting outcome effect using qualitative descriptors.
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The improvement relies on thematic analysis; a widely accepted method of social science
inquiry that when implemented properly exhibits a high degree of confidence and error
avoidance (Flick, 1998). It is a research tool that allows one to aggregate research results
and compare results across multiple studies having similar but not identical
characteristics (Braun & Clarke, 2008). A multiple study thematic analysis was selected
because it may identify differences and similarities between research outcomes
highlighting values not evident in any one single study.
Unlike the t or F statistical tests, this method does not rely upon sample size to
describe significance. Rather, it utilizes a methodology to compare the meaningful
aspects of data of different studies to determine significance. Thematic analysis is
important not only for its ability to compare effects across multiple studies, but also for
its ability to combine experimental results from studies with different population sizes
(Braun & Clarke, 2012). Even relatively small studies can become more useful when
their result is combined with and compared to results from larger studies. Synthesis
increases the analytical usefulness of otherwise accurate and descriptive yet less
impactful studies (Braun & Clarke, 2012).
Comparing the outcomes of different studies incorporating different population
sizes or variable characteristics can present a challenge. While a Null Hypothesis
Significance Test result may provide a way to classify a null hypothesis as either ‘likely’
or ‘unlikely’ to occur in the population based upon a defined confidence criterion it does
little to increase knowledge about the magnitude or objective importance of the observed
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effect. The issue is evident where there is a statistically significant but small effect size
that has a high level of real-life importance, or a large effect size having a lower real-life
importance. Effect size may be subjective and somewhat arbitrary unless the context
from which it is being reported is understood. Effect size is derived from a study’s
sample size, variability, and outcome (Boslaugh, 2012). Instead of inquiring simply
whether an observed result is a function of population or represents a significant effect,
effect size analysis inquiries into the magnitude of an observed effect.
Standard significance testing methods indicate the likelihood that an observed
result is due to population variances or sampling anomalies. The accuracy of a result
subjected to Null Hypothesis Significance Testing is based upon probability inference
and relies on population sample size. For example, a sample of five-million data points
may yield a ‘significant’ result because when compared against the null (0) a fractionally
small mean difference can appear statistically important; while the same mean difference
in a one-hundred-point data sample would not be labeled as significant.
The method selected for this study incorporates an aggregation of statistical
inferences to describe cross-study outcomes irrespective of individual statistical
significance. It incorporates effect size as an objective standardized measure of the
importance of an observed effect (Field, 2005), to compare the magnitude of variation in
research outcomes in studies that may have used non-similar measurement scales or
variables.

61
Secondary Data Analysis
Secondary data was analyzed to identify relationships between the variables
changes in privacy behavior and domestic government surveillance programs. The
analysis was designed to safeguard against the influence of bias, internal, and external
variables, selected data sets were aggregated, and responses that are not applicable to the
study or that are unable to be normalized were redacted.
Inclusion of archival data was accomplished by using a selection protocol
designed to ensure homogeneous data across sets to mitigate potential selection bias. The
protocol required that the data selected parallel the nature of this study’s variables as
closely as possible. The data was place and time appropriate and derived from the
national population (individuals residing in the United States and who have access to
media). The Pew research data selected for the study is content appropriate, topically
consistent, single-sourced, secondary data providing a substantial volume of data points,
variety of demographic, and continuity over years that would not otherwise be available
in a primary study that is limited by financial and logistical constraints.
The Pew research data included 3,379 data points from year 2006 (prior to the
Snowden leak occurring June 5, 2013), 2,803 data points from 2013, 1,580 data points
from 2014 (noting a three day overlap into 2015), and 461 from 2015; totaling 8,223
available data points. The data offers valuable insight into individual privacy expectations
through a multi-year window and suggesting how the United States population responded
to the disclosure of government surveillance programs. The study merges the results of
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the secondary data analysis with the information from the thematic analysis. This resulted
in a synthesis of data patterns and inferential conclusions about the population response
to domestic government surveillance.
While each the Pew data sets were wholly applicable to the question(s) addressed
in the study there was a significant degree of variation in both the semantic structure and
phraseology. This highlights the importance of the coding structure that was developed
for the study.
Coding
The analysis required a degree of reliable data uniformity to operate properly. To
achieve this the study relied on coding techniques to translate non-linear variables
obtained from multiple datasets into a usable format that could be statistically analyzed.
The outcome of each dataset was coded in accordance with the coding scheme described
herein and a resultant quantitative effect was captured and reported. Coding the data
obtained from the Pew research datasets was undertaken by assigning categorical values
to each participant response.
Once the data were coded by the software it was used to generate an analytical
result. This informed the study about relationships between mass monitoring and a
population response to it. Multiple independent variable logistical regression outputs
were correlated and examined to identify statistically significant associations. Logistical
regression was chosen as a predictive analysis model for its ability to analyze
independent variables and provide a statistical outcome using a categorical dependent
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variable. The research was analyzed via the coded outcome of questions posed to
participants regarding their thoughts and behavior while being surveilled or monitored by
the government. The result informed the research as to whether intrusive surveillance
programs influence individual behavior. Results are noted in Chapter 4 of the study.
Trustworthiness
Some studies require the use of an external committee evaluation or a pilot study
to test the validity of the study instrument prior to actual implementation. However,
because this study utilized secondary data and thematic analysis a pilot study was not
required.
Both external and internal validity was paramount to ensuring a reliable study
outcome. A lower level of validity may have affected the accuracy of the study’s
inferences or conclusions. The quantitative orientation of the study lends itself to a higher
level of external validity beyond the existing study as it may support the work of a future
researcher attempting a similar type of study in a different place and time.
This study was undertaken to understand the privacy behavior of a national
population notwithstanding potentially significant changes in the security environment.
The sample population was inferred from the national population and is not
geographically or demographically restrictive (except the English language requirement).
The study results reflected population sentiment and behavior regarding personal privacy
over a period of years.
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The data in the secondary data analysis was obtained from the Pew research data
sets described above. Data points were obtained from a randomized test population using
two combined probability sampling methods, random digit dialing (RDD), and addressbased sampling (ABS) (Pew, 2020). Both the RDD and ABS methods may offer
independent advantages and disadvantages. Utilizing both methods in combination with
one another may provide increased sampling accuracy. RDD telephone surveys have
historically been the gold standard of obtaining data using surveys (Yeager, et al., 2009).
However, some sample populations may present difficulties if they include
individuals who do not use a landline phone, who implement call screening, or who
present with a high degree of privacy. The ABS solution offers an economical, less
intrusive sampling method that includes the ability to access non-landline households
(Yeager, et al., 2009). Utilization of both methods in this study may help with mitigation
of potentially missing or misleading data from a diverse sample population.
Internal validity describes the reliability between the dependent and independent
variables (Bhandari, 2020). It underlines the statistical analysis methodology and assists
the reader in understanding the nature of the measures of association (Bhandari, 2020).
Standard internal validity threats like experimental mortality, instrumentation, and
maturation were not applicable here because the data is archival and the analysis is a
thematic analysis.
Internal validity was accomplished by implementing cross tabulation analysis
using the independent variable to identify a correlation with the dependent variable. A
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correlative relationship was identified where a change of behavior within the sample
population (the dependent variable), corresponded with the public learning that their
communications are being monitored by the government, (the independent variable). The
statistical analysis was undertaken using SPSS software Version 23.
The reliability characteristic of a research study outcome provides another
indicator of the study’s robustness and worthiness of the result (BRM, 2019). Reliability
refers to a study’s level of dependability, consistency, and ability to be repeated in the
future by other researchers. One measure of reliability is the test-retest method (BRM,
2019). As the name suggests, this method requires administration of the test instrument
two or more times during different time frames and the outcomes of the tests can later be
correlated to demonstrate the stability or reliability over time of the test (BRM, 2019). In
this study many of the data points available from the Pew research datasets included
responses to questions obtained during more than a single time frame. This is useful
because it operates like a built-in reliability test ensuring that there is continuity of
responses over time.
A second type of statistical reliability is called instrument reliability, a measure of
the research study’s instrument (or procedure), that will be used in the data gathering
phase (Research Rundowns, 2020). Selection of a research instrument is dependent on the
type of data, unit of analysis, and study design requirements. Evaluation of the instrument
used to gather date for this study was not applicable because the data was acquired from
secondary source datasets. However, this study could be susceptible to instrument
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reliability errors where aggregated data processing is not undertaken correctly so
reliability testing was used to confirm valid performance.
Ethical Considerations
This study had a minimum of ethical considerations. The study did not access
protected information or confidential data sources. The University IRB application
approval letter was submitted separately and research was not undertaken until
permission was granted by the IRB. All data utilized in the study was publicly available
and could be obtained from non-human sources with no associated identities attached.
The data in both the thematic analysis and secondary data portions of the study had
previously passed through the Pew research screening process that include double
anonymous, confidentiality protections built in (Pew, 2020). All data and associated
study information was securely stored in a password protected Microsoft cloud storage
account that is only accessible by me, unless I grant authorization to another. The
information will remain securely stored for a minimum of seven (7) years and will be
destroyed at the end of the data holding period.
Summary
This research study utilized two different analytical techniques to explore the
hypothesis that elite theory has a place in security policy creation and security policy
analysis. The research examined the relationship between privacy sensitivity (as a proxy
for understanding policy apathy), domestic government mass surveillance spying
programs, and change in individual behavior. This chapter provided a review of the
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research methodology, an explanation of the design approach, and a detailed overview of
the information that was used in the study. A total of nearly 5,000 data points are
analyzed for pattern and relationship significance resulting in a test of the hypotheses that
follows in Chapter 4.
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Chapter 4: Results of the Study
Introduction
The purpose of this research study was to examine the applicability of elite theory
as a theoretical tool in social policy modeling and analysis and to investigate whether it
may accurately anticipate behavior relating to social change. This chapter explains the
result obtained from an analysis of open source data collected from a United States
population surveyed on issues of privacy and government monitoring.
This study is useful because it provides a framework for analyzing the research
question and assists with understanding the research hypothesis. The results of this study
contribute to the depository of scholarly literature available to policy professionals who
create and review new social policy.
The study was designed to test the hypothesis that elite theory may explain social
behavior and may be used as a theoretical tool in policy creation and analysis. The
literature review, study design, and research methodology were developed to contribute
to existing research on issues of privacy, social policy, and individual action. A thematic
analysis was used to identify and compare current trend-based patterns of individuals
across America.
The research hypothesis suggested that elite theory could be useful in social
change decision making. The hypothesis was tested by analyzing the relationship
between individual privacy change and privacy safeguarding behavior during government
mass surveillance. To explain the data and how it applies to the research inquiry this
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chapter provides research results in table format, examines the thematic analysis, and
explains the secondary data analysis. Chapter 5 will summarize the results and integrate
them into the research inquiry.
Thematic Analysis
As mentioned previously, notions of privacy and security are flexible ideas that
change over time across a society (Mulligan et al., 2016). It is most appropriate to inspect
the concepts through a wide lens from different perspectives. Privacy, whether social or
individual continues to occupy an important space in modern life (Mulligan et al., 2016).
This is especially true as technological advancements erode existing social configurations
of privacy and individuality while government officials attempt to address modern social
issues (Mulligan et al., 2016).
It is paramount that stakeholders have tools to assist with the process of adapting
new policy to existing sociolegal frameworks. Sociolegal issues around privacy and
security appear in some of America’s earliest legal cases and continue through present
day legislation (Green, A. 2020). For this reason, a thematic analysis of relevant legal and
academic studies was chosen to analyze the variables of government, privacy, and civil
liberties. To best understand these complex ideas in the context of this paper, 11 studies
were analyzed alongside 39 data sets using selective coding techniques.
Significance testing (hypothesis testing) conventionally results in an answer of
zero or not zero, meaning that there is a statistically not zero significance in the result
(Lund Research, 2018). The result or effect is not zero and therefore the hypothesis null
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can be rejected (Lund Research, 2018). The p value indicates that the results observed are
not statistically by chance (Lund Research, 2018). For example, if an exercise program
results in muscle gain than the program is significant to gain muscle, though participants
may only have gained a 1% or less increase in lean mass. However, this method of testing
does not describe how much muscle was gained or whether those gains are enough to be
physically noticed. It only informs that there was in fact some correlation between the
exercise program and a gain in muscle. If one wishes to know whether the exercise
program will yield a resultant change large enough to be notice in the mirror, this test
outcome is not sufficient because it neglects to report on objective program effectiveness
or the magnitude of muscle mass change.
In contrast, a thematic analysis uses an objective formula applied to emergent
themes (Mulligan et al., 2016). This method is more robust than that of single-outcome
method and offers a result based on multiple study outcomes (Mulligan et al., 2016). The
intent is to capture the result of more than one study and use them to determine whether
the outcomes are significant (Mulligan et al., 2016). This increases the test power of the
study and improves effect estimates. It also provides for the reporting of unstandardized
effect sizes and synthesizes the result of multiple studies providing a single conclusory
summary (Mulligan et al., 2016).
In this study, I examined the relationship between awareness of domestic
government surveillance and changes in individual behavior. This inquiry is addressed by
a thematic analysis of several different studies to understand how individuals view
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privacy and respond to privacy changes. The information in other research studies and the
data provided by the Pew research datasets benefited from a thematic analysis because it
described multiple case participants over a varied period with changed sample sizes.
Data Collection
Table 2 presents existing research and sources used in the thematic analysis.
Table 2
Sources for Thematic Analysis
Name of Source
Author
An economic theory of democracy
Downs
Democracy and Political Ignorance: Why Smaller
Somin
Government Is Smarter, Second Edition.
Who rules America? Power, politics, & social
Domhoff
change
Your Data Shadow: An exploratory study of the
Farid
short-term effect of viewing news and
information content on surveillance technologies
on perceptions of privacy.
Americans’ Attitudes About Privacy, Security
Madden & Rainie
and Surveillance.
Government Surveillance and Internet Search
Marthews & Tucker
Behavior.
Long-term effects of ubiquitous surveillance in
Oulasvirta
the home.
Social pressure, surveillance and community size:
Panagopoulos
Evidence from field experiments on voter turnout.
The Chilling Effect of Government Surveillance
Sidhu
Programs on the Use of the Internet by MuslimAmericans.
After Snowden: Rethinking the Impact of
Bauman
Surveillance. International Political Sociology.
Civil Liberties vs. Security: Public Opinion in the
Davis & Silver
Context of the Terrorist Attacks on America.
The Conforming Effect: First Amendment
Kaminski, Margot,
Implications of Surveillance, Beyond Chilling
Witnov, & Shane
Speech.

Date
2003
2016
2010
2015

2015
2017
2012
2011
2007

2014
2004
2015
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Each of these studies was analyzed using thematic analysis to summarize relevant
qualitative data in a quantitative manner suitable to inform the Pew research data
discussed below. Step 1 was to review, analyze, and code the texts and step two was to
sort the coded data into units or related code groups. This procedure was undertaken to
allow for the initial emergence of identifiable, describable meanings and relationships
across the research that could be documented and applied to the secondary data sets.
While the emergence of thematic data in this study does not explain causality or data
meaning, it may inform the review of the secondary quantitative data analysis and allow
for a better understanding of statistical results. The process of coding is explained below
under Themes and Coding.
Survey Data
This study used secondary data from public source surveys obtained from the Pew
research website. Survey materials were in the form of electronic data in question-answer
format. Each participant responded to the survey and provided an answer to the survey
question using a Web-based survey form. The survey inquiries, which are describe below
and attached in the appendices, include relevant topics like privacy, security, government,
and technology. The data obtained was secured in a password protected cloud vault
where it will remain for a period of at least 7 years. Access will be limited to me and my
authorized representative if appropriate.
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There is no participant identification or personal information associated with the
data or attached to the research results. While anonymity may be a benefit to the safety of
the research participants ensuring their identities are protected it did limit my ability to
attest to the accuracy of the survey question responses. I relied on the representations of
the participants that they used their best information and reasoned logic to answer each
survey question accurately and honestly. Any data anomalies or missing data was taken
into account for purposes of analysis and after careful review of the survey questions,
answers, and methods of reporting, I am satisfied that the data obtained and provided in
this research paper is accurate and meets acceptability requirements for dissertation level
scholarship.
The first data set is from the Pew Research Center’s Internet Project/GFK Privacy
Panel Survey #1. The survey was conducted online between January 10, 2014 and
January 27, 2014 and applied to a sample of N=607 English speaking adults age 18 and
over who agreed to be part of a group taking online surveys of current issues, some of
which relate to technology. There were a nationally representative sample of 1,537
individuals invited to join the panel with 60.8% (935) responding and 64.8% (607)
agreeing to complete the first of the surveys. The survey data are representative of the
national population and are based on a random sample of all 50 states and the District of
Columbia and is adjusted for age, family size, gender, education, and race population
parameters from the U.S. Census Bureau. The sampling methodology used yields results
within three points of the actual population values.
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The panel members were obtained through random digit dialing (RDD) and
address-based sampling (ABS) methodologies provided by Marketing Systems Group.
The selected group includes households with cellphone, landline phones, and no phones.
For those without access to Internet, devices and service were provided to them. The 607
member sample accounts for current patterns of Internet access, gender, age, education,
race, income, home ownership, and geography to parameters from the Census Bureau’s
Current Population Survey (CPS), as adjusted for bias due to nonresponse or
noncoverage. As a result, the first survey has a sampling error of plus or minus 4.6
percentage points at a 95% level of confidence. The second and third survey have a
sampling error of plus or minus 5.6 percentage points. The fourth survey has a sampling
error of plus or minus 5.8 percentage points.
The second survey data is from the Pew Research Center’s Internet Project/GFK
Privacy Panel Survey #2. The survey was conducted online between August 5, 2014 and
September 2, 2014 and applied to a sample of N=498 English speaking adults age 18 and
over. The third survey data is from the Pew Research Center’s Internet Project/GFK
Privacy Panel Survey #3. The survey was conducted online between November 26, 2014
and January 3, 2015 and applied to a sample of N=475 English speaking adults age 18
and over. The fourth survey data is from the Pew Research Center’s Internet Project/GFK
Privacy Panel Survey #4. The survey was conducted online between January 27, 2015
and February 16, 2015 and applied to a sample of N=461 English speaking adults age 18
and over.
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My study was designed to facilitate an understanding of how individuals across
America view several key areas of personal privacy in consideration of modern
technology and social trends. This included specific inquiries about information sharing
and whether respondents believe American citizens should be concerned about
government monitoring of phone calls, text, and Internet communications.
The central research inquiry was whether elite theory may serve as a working
social theory that is applicable to policy-based decision making. The question is
important because if elite theory is reliable it may be employed by policy professionals
who review existing policies as well as those tasked with creating new social policy.
Specifically, if elite theory suggests that it is the elite who control social policy and
policy can be designed and implemented with little regard for the nonelite population
(Domhoff, 2010), then policy need only be drafted to fulfill the goal of government and
the elite stakeholders and not the population.
My study was guided by secondary data obtained from surveys inquiring how
individuals view privacy and whether they are invested in securing sensitive information
or rather, they are uninterested, uninformed, acquiescing, and need not be strongly
considered during policy evaluation.
Themes and Coding
I identified six emergent theme categories from the other research papers using
thematic coding procedures and then applied each to the survey questions analyzing data
provided by the participants. I then coded the data by assigning a value to each
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participant answer based on where the answer fell within each category. For example,
Question 19 asks participants if they have changed internet or cell phone use in recent
months to avoid having their activities tracked or noticed. The answers were coded (a)
not changed; (b) changed; and (c) no answer. They were categorized under “changed
behavior”. This provided an easily understood categorization of useable data and
eliminated an otherwise complex range of answers associated with many of the questions.
The coded survey answers were then combined with other coded data to determine
participant views of privacy and their behavioral response to government monitoring.
My analysis of the survey data was designed to test the stated research
hypotheses. Data were obtained from answers to survey questions administered to a
randomized population of English-speaking adults. The survey responses used in the
analysis reflect the ordinal subtypes of the dependent variable (individual privacy
behavior), in consideration of government monitoring. Responses are represented below
as percentage answers (x percent of responses within each category). Participant
responses reveal several emergent themes that are connected to the research question;
each triangulated and confirmed. The six themes and their associated code are identified
as follows and the questions and coded responses are displayed in Appendix A.
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Table 3
Themes and Coding
Government
trust and
accountability

Generalized
concern about
privacy

Changing
future
behavior

Knowledge of
government
monitoring

Acceptance of
government
monitoring

Changed
behavior

A favorable
government
view

not concerned
secure

no change

knowledge

accept

no change

B not favorable
government
view

concerned/
not secure

change

no knowledge

not accept

Changed

C no answer

no answer

no answer

no answer

no answer

no answer

Summary
The research presented in this chapter (data found in Appendix A), are the
responses of individuals from a randomized population as they go about daily life in an
environment of domestic governmental monitoring. The data suggest that most
individuals surveyed do know about government monitoring, have concerns about
privacy, and indicate that they would like to do more to protect it.
Although participants describe an ongoing concern for personal privacy and
believe government surveillance of private citizens should be limited, my research
suggested that they did not take significant and sustained actions to mitigate government
surveillance in their personal lives. The research indicated that a majority of people did
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not significantly shield their exposure to surveillance or change their personal behavior to
reduce the footprints they leave behind on the surveillance landscape.
Chapter 5 provides a detailed compilation of the information and data provided in
the previous chapters including the literature review. It offers an analysis of the data in
Chapter 4 and provides the reader with a summary of the result. The chapter continues
with an in-depth interpretation of the findings, recommendations for future research, and
demonstrates a case for the application of elite theory in addressing a real-world policy
issue. Finally, I comment on the potential impact of this research on social change and
how the outcome may be used by both policy professionals and academics in the future.
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Chapter 5: Findings and Discussion
Overview
Shortly after the attacks on September 11, 2001 the U.S. government initiated
several new security policies aimed at preventing similar attacks on the United States
from happening in the future (American Civil Liberties Union, 2020). Twenty years later,
there have been no terror attacks on the United States that were equal in magnitude to the
9/11 attacks (CNN, 2020). This may be evidence that the changed U.S. national security
policies have worked though questions persist about the causal relationship between the
security policy changes and the 20 years that elapsed between 9/11 and now. This is
especially true in light of comments by a top white house official regarding the efficacy
of bulk data collection techniques with respect to stopping terrorism wherein he indicated
that they found none. (see Isikoff, 2013).
In 2013 a U.S. government contractor named Edward Snowden exposed several
top-secret domestic spying programs used for bulk data collection and the relationship
between government data analysis, large corporations, commercial big data, and the
personal data of every citizen to which the U.S. government had access (Lawfare, 2020).
The purpose of my study was to explore the relationship between the diminution
of individual privacy due to those government mass surveillance programs and the
societal response to it across the national population. I designed the research question to
investigate whether a fractional loss of an established civil liberty would trigger a
response within the population (a substantial and sustained increase in privacy protection
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behavior). My hypothesis was that (in conformance with elite theory), it would not. If
that were the case one could image that any new or changed security policy need not
necessarily account for collateral social consequences and that policy could instead focus
solely on governmental interests.
Existing literature provided insight into the evolution of individual privacy in
America and even touched on societal responses associated with changes in
governmental policy but neglected to address whether elite theory (operating as a modern
social theory), may be used to suggest social policy change outcomes prior to
implantation of a new or changed policy.
Publication of this paper may contribute to a particularized understanding of
whether policy professionals may rely upon elite theory to assist them as they gauge
whether or not a policy proposal will drive social action toward an undesirable result. It
also establishes a base for further academic inquiry into similar areas of research into
different social theories and their similar use in policy analysis.
Analysis of the data from this study suggested that a large majority of the
population does know that the government collects private information about citizens:
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Figure 1. Question 14 (sp17)
The data also suggested that individuals believe citizens should be concerned
about the fact that it is happening:

Figure 2. Question 11 (sp9) i
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The data further suggested that respondents themselves are concerned about the
fact that the government is secretly reviewing information about them:

Figure 3. Question 13 (sp11)
Most people surveyed disagree or strongly disagree that it is good for someone to
‘keep an eye’ on their online activity:
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Figure 4. Question 18 (sp28)
A majority of those surveyed believed it is unacceptable for the U.S. government
to monitor its own people.
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Figure 5. Question 27 (s14)
Respondents considered themselves to be mostly private.

Figure 6. Question 23 (sp9)
They also indicated that the limits on the information that the government can
collect about them are not adequate.
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Figure 7. Question 18 (sp28)
People believed that the government can be trusted some of the time or never.

Figure 8. Question 1 (sp2)
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The anticipated behavioral response of individuals in a population that maintains
an overall distrust of or have a generally unfavorable view of government would be for
them to continue or increase privacy shielding behavior(s). A majority of those surveyed
stated they do not feel that they do enough to protect their private information.

Figure 9. Question 3 (sp6)
Analysis of the combined survey data suggest that most of the population fit
within the following criteria:
•

were generally private

•

had knowledge that the government is secretly monitoring them

•

thought that there are not adequate limits on the government

•

believed the government should not be trusted

•

did not think is good for someone to watch their online activity
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•

believed others should be concerned about this

•

were themselves in fact concerned
Interpretation of the Findings

This study provided a review of personal privacy in the United States and an
analysis of population data regarding personal privacy compiled over a multi-year period.
The study was designed to facilitate a generally applicable result that is reproducible and
can withstand external scrutiny. Following a thematic analysis of existing studies and the
statistical analysis of secondary data I was able to extract and interpret several emergent
themes using a selective coding technique. Ultimately this led me to conclude that the
null hypothesis may be rejected and that the stated hypothesis may be accepted.
The data show that U.S. population behavior generally does adhere to the
elements of elite theory. Individuals across the U.S. hold strong views when it comes to
personal privacy and freedom from surveillance. Following a disruptive change to
domestic security policy one may expect significant changes in the public’s collateral
privacy behavior. However, as described by the elements of elite theory this is not what
actually happens. My research suggests that people did not always behave in accord with
their stated views and may not have enacted meaningful behavioral changes to protect
their privacy.
A review of the secondary data provided several insights into the U.S.
population’s perception of government as well as their individual beliefs and behaviors
following the 2013 Snowden leak. The literature review provided thematic interpretation
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of the theories behind the observed data. Specially, thematic comparison among studies
consistently confirmed that individuals are unmoved, uninterested, and remain aloof in
the long-term following the release of Snowden’s 2013 information about domestic
government spying.
This parallels with the expectation of elite theory. In the Sidhu study of Muslims
after 9/11 it was already known that the government was using several data gathering
tools including Carnivore, Echelon, and Magic Lantern (although the extent to which
monitoring was occurring of all US citizens was not known until 2013), to spy on
citizens. Yet 86.8% of respondents said they had not changed their general activities due
to a concern that the government may be monitoring them, 65.9% of respondents stated
that they were not personally aware of any other Muslims in the United States who
changed, in any way, their general activities after 9/11 because of a concern that the
government may be monitoring their activities, and 89.1% of respondents said they have
not changed their Internet usage at all, the sites they visit or the amount of time they
spend on the Internet, after 9/11 due to a concern that the government may be monitoring
their activities (Sidhu, 2007).
That study used data acquired following 9/11 and specifically examined Muslims
(as a group who believe they were to be directly targeted by post-9/11 monitoring). It was
acknowledged by the author that, “[w]hat accounts for the difference between the belief
that the government is monitoring the Internet activities of Muslim-Americans and
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resultant changes in online behavior is unclear” (Sidhu, 2007). My research suggests that
the answer could be found in a thorough understanding of elite theory.
In the Marthews and Tucker 2017 study where the authors reported that there was
variation in search engine query following the 2013 Snowden leak, the data involved a
limited subset of search terms comprised of high levels of sensitivity. It makes sense that
a downturn in search volume would occur in ‘sensitive searches’ after people just learned
that the government was watching their Google queries. This response is even anticipated
by the Oulasvirta and study that suggested when there is a temporary adjustment to new
(changed), surveillance monitoring the population will adapt and regress to pre-change
behavior. Again, these results are expected by elite theory.
Summary of the Findings
The overarching role of this research study was to provide policy
professionals with an insight into whether elite theory may be relied upon when decision
makers consider a population’s response to the implementation of new social policy. The
study results suggested that elite theory is a useful social theory that may be capable of
indicating behavioral outcomes to new or different social policy.
The null hypothesis or default assumption of my research asserted that when the
U.S. population realizes the government is seriously infringing upon an established
liberty (secretly spying on them having surreptitiously inserted mass domestic
surveillance into virtually every aspect of their private life), it will change and adopt
some affirmative protective behavior in response. The data suggested that this null
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hypothesis may be rejected and that a majority of the population does not substantially
alter behavior or adopt permanent protective measures in response to policy changes.
Coding theme B (no-change responses) as 2 or above and theme A (yes-change
responses) as 1; I obtained mean scores for all the change responses as follows:
Table 4
Descriptive Statistics
N

Range

Mean

Std. Deviation

Variance

SMEAN(Q19_p2_sp9)

498

3

2

.428

.183

SMEAN(Q20_p2_sp11a)

498

4

2

.684

.468

SMEAN(Q20_p2_sp11b)

498

4

2

.582

.338

SMEAN(Q20_p2_sp11c)

498

4

2

.673

.453

SMEAN(Q20_p2_sp11d)

498

4

2

.669

.448

SMEAN(Q20_p2_sp11e)

498

4

1

.674

.454

SMEAN(Q20_p2_sp11f)

498

4

2

.624

.389

SMEAN(Q20_p2_sp11g)

498

4

2

.564

.318

SMEAN(Q20_p2_sp11h)

498

4

2

.688

.474

SMEAN(Q20_p2_sp11i)

498

4

2

.735

.541

SMEAN(Q20_p2_sp11j)

498

4

2

.652

.425

SMEAN(Q20_p2_sp11k)

498

4

2

.603

.364

SMEAN(Q20_p2_sp11l)

498

4

2

.648

.420

SMEAN(Q20_p2_sp11m)

498

4

1

.711

.505

SMEAN(Q37_p3_sp29b)

498

3

3

.835

.697

SMEAN(Q37_p3_sp29c)

498

3

4

.671

.450

SMEAN(Q37_p3_sp29d)

498

3

3

.814

.663

SMEAN(Q37_p3_sp29e)

498

3

3

.799

.638

SMEAN(Q37_p3_sp29f)

498

3

3

.765

.586

SMEAN(Q37_p3_sp29g)

498

3

3

.855

.732

SMEAN(Q38_p3_sp32a)

498

3

3

.819

.671

SMEAN(Q38_p3_sp32b)

498

3

3

.718

.516

SMEAN(Q38_p3_sp32c)

498

3

3

.881

.776

SMEAN(Q38_p3_sp32d)

498

3

3

.895

.800
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SMEAN(Q38_p3_sp32e)

498

3

3

.649

.421

SMEAN(Q38_p3_sp32f)

498

3

3

.719

.517

SMEAN(Q38_p3_sp32g)

498

3

3

.829

.687

SMEAN(Q38_p3_sp32h)

498

3

3

.796

.633

SMEAN(Q38_p3_sp32i)

498

3

3

.646

.418

SMEAN(Q38_p3_sp32j)

498

3

3

.722

.522

SMEAN(Q38_p3_sp32k)

498

3

3

.738

.545

SMEAN(Q39_p3_sp35a)

498

3

3

.708

.501

SMEAN(Q39_p3_sp35b)

498

3

3

.603

.364

SMEAN(Q39_p3_sp35c)

498

3

3

.592

.351

SMEAN(Q39_p3_sp35d)

498

3

2

.825

.681

SMEAN(Q39_p3_sp35e)

498

3

3

.651

.424

SMEAN(Q39_p3_sp35f)

498

3

3

.733

.537

SMEAN(Q39_p3_sp35i)

498

3

3

.616

.379

Valid N (listwise)

498

As this tables demonstrates, of the data samples collected there were only two samples
that indicated a change behavior. All other samples indicate no change in behavior was
identified.
Additional Research
Several questions related to issues of security policy and social change are ripe for
additional inquiry. As of the writing of this paper there have been no publicly reported
mass terror incidents anywhere on the globe similar in magnitude to those that occurred
in the U.S. on 9/11 (CNN, 2020). Is this attributable to America’s changed national
security policies over the past twenty years? If so, was the reduction in civil liberties a
reasonable tradeoff? Must those policies continue or even be amplified to maintain
domestic safety? Was 9/11 a one-off that would not have repeated even if intrusive
government monitoring programs were not employed? What happens to civil rights if
another 9/11 type-event occurs? How would security policy change again? To what
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extent would the civil liberties of citizens change? My research did not address these
questions or the assumption that increased monitoring of the population by the
government causally effects citizen safety in a significant and positively correlated way
and all of these questions remain.
If the 2013 Snowden leak or similar release of classified information had not
occurred, I would not have been able to undertake this research and American society
would likely have remained in the dark with respect to these questions. Twenty years
after 9/11 and seven years after the Snowden leak, the public is still not privy to details of
national security policy or its true effectiveness because it remains classified and
insulated from public inquiry. While my research has shown that privacy and civil
liberties have decreased and the government has more information than ever about each
one of us, there is no data, no statistics, no transparency, no way to quantify security
policy effectiveness without additional information releases.
Social Change and Future Public Policy Implications
The research question addressed in this paper goes well beyond whether citizens
will accept losses of civil liberties in exchange for perceived increases of general
security. I inquired whether the input of millions of nonelites matter at all. Elite theory
seems to suggest that the nonelite public have little to no regard for policy and that over
time even the majority of those with strongly held policy contradicting beliefs will adapt
to policy changes. This research is applicable to several divisive current day social policy
questions.
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In the years following the start of this dissertation and after media coverage of
dozens of mass shooting incidents occurring since 2014 (defined as a shooting involving
three or more fatalities), increasing numbers of Americas voiced support of stricter
national gun control policies. In response to those incidents U.S. government officials
proposed several new or modified policies regarding legal gun ownership. Most notable
was an official policy statement that guns should be outlawed and even confiscated from
lawful U.S. owners (Biden, 2020).
While many of the proposals are probably unconstitutional and may be politically
motivated others represent serious strategies for closing purchasing loopholes and
decreasing ease of access to potential non-lawful owners. As a result, policy professionals
may use theoretical tools to make educated estimations regarding gun control policy
outcomes. According to my research if policy can be justified through general threats to
safety the collateral social consequences need not require exceptional scrutiny by policy
makers.
If lawful gun owners reject new or changed regulation and even forced
confiscation my research suggests a majority of individuals will adapt and acquiescence.
As goes the case for a reduction in a civil liberty like privacy may go the case for a
reduction in 2nd Amendment rights. One may expect that some gun owners would exhibit
defiance (similar to the few individuals who attempt to anonymize their data footprint),
but the overall majority would not and a majority of those that do will eventually
acquiesce.
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In early March 2020, the United States was faced with responding to the
Pandemic disease COVID-19. Among the (very delayed), policies implemented by the
U.S. government in an attempt to minimize and mitigate the harm done by virus spread
was the wearing of masks and the virtual lockdown of travel and small businesses by
federal and state officials. Many legal safeguards were abandoned in the name of health
and safety as State governors exercised orders of increasingly strict measures in order to
protect the public from itself. In an April, 2020 interview on the Fox News channel by
Tucker Carlson, the New Jersey state Governor stated that, “I wasn’t thinking of the Bill
of Rights when we did this…”. An admission from the highest-ranking authority in the
State of New Jersey that policies were put into place without concern for civil legal
protections.
As predicted by the results of this research, while some individuals initially
voiced concerns against lockdowns and mask wearing the vast majority acquiesced
despite contradictory indicators and lacking scientific evidence. By late September, 2020
daily masking wearing become normalized and business offered many different styles for
consumers to purchase. These social policy examples of gun control, quarantine, and
mask wearing exemplify additional areas of policy beside privacy to which this area of
research may be applicable.
The research results indicated in this paper do not suggest that policy
professionals must or even should incorporate elite theory into decision making. Rather,
my intention was to offer this research as guidance to other academics and researchers
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who are interested in understanding how social policy change decisions may be acted
upon and to be guided accordingly.
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Appendix A: Tables
A total of 607 participants provided data for the privacy survey and there were 39
questions used in the analysis. Each question was coded with one of three possible
outcomes creating a total of 117 coded data points for review. The following questions
were obtained from Survey 1 and represent a percent of total answers.
Table A5
Question 1. (sp2) How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in
Washington to do what is right?
Answer

Percentage

Code

Just About Always

2%

A

Most of the Time

16%

A

Only Some of the Time

67%

B

Never

14%

B

Refused

1%

C

Notes. A total of 606 of 607 respondents answered this question.

109
Table A6
Question 2. (sp7) Thinking about your daily life, when you have private information that
you would like to share with another trusted person or organization, how secure do you
feel [using the following devices or methods]?
a. Telephone line
Answer

Percentage

Code

Very Secure

16%

A

Somewhat Secure

51%

A

Not Very Secure

19%

B

Not at All Secure

12%

B

Refused

1%

C

Notes. A total of 606 of 607 respondents answered this question.
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Table A7
b. Cell phone
Answer

Percentage

Code

Very Secure

9%

A

Somewhat Secure

43%

A

Not Very Secure

29%

B

Not at All Secure

17%

B

Refused

2%

C

Notes. A total of 605 of 607 respondents answered this question.
Table A8
c. Text message
Answer

Percentage

Code

Very Secure

7%

A

Somewhat Secure

32%

A

Not Very Secure

37%

B

Not at All Secure

22%

B

Refused

7%

C

Notes. A total of 604 of 607 respondents answered this question
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Table A9
d. Email
Answer

Percentage

Code

Very Secure

5%

A

Somewhat Secure

35%

A

Not Very Secure

36%

B

Not at All Secure

21%

B

Refused

2%

C

Notes. A total of 605 of 607 respondents answered this question
Table A10
e. Chat or Instant messenger
Answer

Percentage

Code

Very Secure

4%

A

Somewhat Secure

25%

A

Not Very Secure

36%

B

Not at All Secure

32%

B

Refused

3%

C

Notes. A total of 604 of 607 respondents answered this question
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Table A11
f. Social media sites
Answer

Percentage

Code

Very Secure

2%

A

Somewhat Secure

14%

A

Not Very Secure

28%

B

Not at All Secure

53%

B

Refused

3%

C

Notes. A total of 604 of 607 respondents answered this question
Table 12
Question 3. (sp6) Do you feel as though you already do enough to protect the privacy of
your personal information online, or do you feel as though you would like to do more?
Answer

Percentage

Code

I Already do Enough

37%

A

Would Like to do More

61%

B

Refused

1%

C

Notes. A total of 606 of 607 respondents answered this question.
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Table 13
Question 4. (sp8) We’d now like to know how you feel about a range of information that
others might learn about you in daily life. For each kind of information, please indicate
how sensitive you consider that information to be – even if some people and
organizations already have access to it.
a. Purchasing habits
Answer

Percentage

Code

Very Sensitive

8%

B

Somewhat Sensitive

33%

B

Not Too Sensitive

44%

A

Not at all Sensitive

14%

A

Refused

1%

C

Notes. A total of 606 of 607 respondents answered this question.
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Table 14
b. Who your friends are and what they are like
Answer

Percentage

Code

Very Sensitive

22%

B

Somewhat Sensitive

46%

B

Not Too Sensitive

23%

A

Not at all Sensitive

7%

A

Refused

2%

C

Notes. A total of 605 of 607 respondents answered this question.
Table 15
c. Details of physical location over time from cellphone data
Answer

Percentage

Code

Very Sensitive

50%

B

Somewhat Sensitive

32%

B

Not Too Sensitive

11%

A

Not at all Sensitive

5%

A

Refused

2%

C

Notes. A total of 605 of 607 respondents answered this question.
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Table 16
d. State of your health and the medicines you take
Answer

Percentage

Code

Very Sensitive

55%

B

Somewhat Sensitive

26%

B

Not Too Sensitive

12%

A

Not at all Sensitive

5%

A

Refused

2%

C

Notes. A total of 605 of 607 respondents answered this question.
Table 17
e. Political views and the candidate you support
Answer

Percentage

Code

Very Sensitive

20%

B

Somewhat Sensitive

31%

B

Not Too Sensitive

30%

A

Not at all Sensitive

17%

A

Refused

2%

C

Notes. A total of 605 of 607 respondents answered this question.
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Table 18
Question 5. (sp8) For each kind of information, please indicate how sensitive you
consider that information to be – even if some people and organizations already have
access to it.
a. Media you like: tastes in music, movies, books, websites, magazines.
Answer

Percentage

Code

Very Sensitive

9%

B

Somewhat Sensitive

22%

B

Not Too Sensitive

45%

A

Not at all Sensitive

21%

A

Refused

2%

C

Notes. A total of 605 of 607 respondents answered this question.
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Table 19
b. Numbers you have called or texted from your phone
Answer

Percentage

Code

Very Sensitive

45%

B

Somewhat Sensitive

30%

B

Not Too Sensitive

16%

A

Not at all Sensitive

6%

A

Refused

3%

C

Notes. A total of 604 of 607 respondents answered this question.
Table 20
c. Your religion or spiritual views
Answer

Percentage

Code

Very Sensitive

22%

B

Somewhat Sensitive

23%

B

Not Too Sensitive

29%

A

Not at all Sensitive

25%

A

Refused

2%

C

Notes. A total of 605 of 607 respondents answered this question.

118
Table 21
d. Your relationship history, including people you have dated or were
romantically involved with in the past
Answer

Percentage

Code

Very Sensitive

40%

B

Somewhat Sensitive

31%

B

Not Too Sensitive

14%

A

Not at all Sensitive

12%

A

Refused

2%

C

Notes. A total of 605 of 607 respondents answered this question.
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Table 22
Question 6. (sp8) For each kind of information, please indicate how sensitive you
consider that information to be – even if some people and organizations already have
access to it.
a. Your birthdate
Answer

Percentage

Code

Very Sensitive

41%

B

Somewhat Sensitive

25%

B

Not Too Sensitive

19%

A

Not at all Sensitive

14%

A

Refused

2%

C

Notes. A total of 605 of 607 respondents answered this question.
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Table 23
b. Your social security number
Answer

Percentage

Code

Very Sensitive

90%

B

Somewhat Sensitive

5%

B

Not Too Sensitive

2%

A

Not at all Sensitive

1%

A

Refused

2%

C

Notes. A total of 605 of 607 respondents answered this question.
Table 24
c. Websites you have visited
Answer

Percentage

Code

Very Sensitive

27%

B

Somewhat Sensitive

43%

B

Not Too Sensitive

20%

A

Not at all Sensitive

8%

A

Refused

2%

C

Notes. A total of 605 of 607 respondents answered this question.
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Table 25
d. Searches you have made using online search engines
Answer

Percentage

Code

Very Sensitive

24%

B

Somewhat Sensitive

41%

B

Not Too Sensitive

22%

A

Not at all Sensitive

10%

A

Refused

3%

C

Notes. A total of 604 of 607 respondents answered this question.
Table 26
e. Content of your email messages
Answer

Percentage

Code

Very Sensitive

52%

B

Somewhat Sensitive

25%

B

Not Too Sensitive

13%

A

Not at all Sensitive

7%

A

Refused

3%

C

Notes. A total of 604 of 607 respondents answered this question.
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Table 27
f. Content of your text messages
Answer

Percentage

Code

Very Sensitive

49%

B

Somewhat Sensitive

26%

B

Not Too Sensitive

13%

A

Not at all Sensitive

8%

A

Refused

4%

C

Notes. A total of 605 of 607 respondents answered this question.
Table 28
g. Content of your phone conversations
Answer

Percentage

Code

Very Sensitive

54%

B

Somewhat Sensitive

27%

B

Not Too Sensitive

13%

A

Not at all Sensitive

4%

A

Refused

2%

C

Notes. A total of 605 of 607 respondents answered this question.
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Table 29
Question 7. (sp9) Some people aren’t too worried about privacy today and others are
concerned about privacy. We’d like to know how you feel about the topic. For each of the
following statements please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree.
a. It is easy for me to be anonymous online
Answer

Percentage

Code

Strongly Agree

3%

A

Agree

20%

A

Disagree

52%

B

Strongly Disagree

22%

B

Refused

2%

C

Notes. A total of 605 of 607 respondents answered this question.
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Table 30
b. I am willing to share some information about myself with companies in order to
use online services for free
Answer

Percentage

Code

Strongly Agree

4%

A

Agree

51%

A

Disagree

31%

B

Strongly Disagree

11%

B

Refused

2%

C

Notes. A total of 605 of 607 respondents answered this question.
Table 31
Question 8. (sp9) f. When I meet new people, I assume that they might search for
information about me on the internet
Answer

Percentage

Code

Strongly Agree

10%

B

Agree

37%

B

Disagree

40%

A

Strongly Disagree

11%

A

Refused

3%

C

Notes. A total of 604 of 607 respondents answered this question.
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Table 32
Question 9. (sp9) If inaccurate information about me got posted online, it would be very
difficult to get it removed
Answer

Percentage

Code

Strongly Agree

39%

B

Agree

49%

B

Disagree

9%

A

Strongly Disagree

1%

A

Refused

2%

C

Notes. A total of 605 of 607 respondents answered this question.
Table 33
Question 10. (sp9) It is a good thing for society if people believe that someone is keeping
an eye on things that they do online
Answer

Percentage

Code

Strongly Agree

7%

A

Agree

29%

A

Disagree

42%

B

Strongly Disagree

20%

B

Refused

2%

C

Notes. A total of 605 of 607 respondents answered this question.
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Table 34
Question 11. (sp9) American citizens should be concerned about the government’s
monitoring of phone calls and internet communications
Answer

Percentage

Code

Strongly Agree

40%

B

Agree

39%

B

Disagree

16%

A

Strongly Disagree

2%

A

Refused

2%

C

Notes. A total of 605 of 607 respondents answered this question.
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Table 35
Question 12. (sp10) How concerned are you, if at all, that some of the information you
share on social networking sites might be accessed by third party advertisers or
businesses without your knowledge?
Answer

Percentage

Code

Very concerned

35%

B

Somewhat concerned

45%

B

Not too concerned

17%

A

Not at all concerned

2%

A

No answer

1%

C

Notes. A total of 399 respondents answered this question.
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Table 36
Question 13. (sp11) How concerned are you, if at all, that some of the information you
share on social networking sites might be accessed by the government without your
knowledge?
Answer

Percentage

Code

Very concerned

37%

B

Somewhat concerned

34%

B

Not too concerned

25%

A

Not at all concerned

4%

A

No answer

0%

C

Notes. A total of 399 respondents answered this question.
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Table 37
Question 14 (sp17). How much, if anything, have you heard about the government
collecting information about telephone calls, emails and other online communications as
part of efforts to monitor terrorist activity?
Answer

Percentage

Code

A lot

43%

A

A little

44%

A

Nothing at all

5%

B

Don’t know

6%

C

Refused

2%

C

Notes. A total of 605 of 607 respondents answered this question.
The following data were obtained from Survey 2.
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Table 38
Question 15: (sp3) Let’s think about a typical day in your life as you spend time at home,
outside your home, and getting from place to place. You use your cellphone and maybe
landline phones. You may use credit cards. You might go online and buy things, use
search engines, watch videos, or check in on social media. As you go through a typical
day, how much control do you feel you have over how much information is collected
about you and how it is being used?
Answer

Percentage

Code

A lot of control

9%

A

Some control

38%

A

Not much control

37%

B

No control at all

13%

B

Refused

3%

C

Notes. A total of 495 of 498 respondents answered this question.
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Table 39
Question 16: (sp7) How much, if anything, have you heard about the government
collecting information about telephone calls, emails and other online communications as
part of the efforts to monitor terrorist activity?
Answer

Percentage

Code

A lot

32%

A

A little

48%

A

Nothing at all

7%

B

Don’t know

6%

C

Refused

2%

C

Notes. A total of 496 of 498 respondents answered this question.
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Table 40
Question 17: (sp27) Overall, do you approve or disapprove of the government’s
collection of telephone and internet data as part of anti-terrorism efforts?
Answer

Percentage

Code

Approve

32%

A

Disapprove

40%

B

Don’t know

26%

C

Refused

2%

C

Notes. A total of 496 of 498 respondents answered this question.
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Table 41
Question 18: (sp28) Thinking about the data the government collects a part of antiterrorism efforts… Do you think there are adequate limits on what telephone and
internet data the government can collect, or not?
Answer

Yes, there are adequate

Percentage

Code

31%

A

65%

B

4%

C

limits on what
government can collect
No, there are adequate
limits on what
government can collect
No answer

Notes. A total of 494 of 498 respondents answered this question.
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Table 42
Question 19: (sp9) Have you changed your internet or cell phone use in recent months in
any way to avoid having your activities tracked or noticed, or haven’t you done
this?
Answer

Percentage

Code

Yes

7%

B

No

91%

A

Refused

3%

C

Notes. A total of 495 of 498 respondents answered this question.
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Table 43
Question 20: (sp11) While using the internet, have you ever done any of the following?
Does Don’t Refused
not know
apply
to
C
C
me
C

Answer/

Yes

No

Code

A

B

a. Used a temporary username or email
address

25

56

9

5

3

b. Added a privacy enhancing browser
plugin like DoNotTrackMe or Privacy
Badger
c. Given inaccurate or misleading
information about yourself

9

72

8

8

3

24

60

7

6

3

d. Set your browser to disable or turned off
cookies

34

43

8

12

3

e. Cleared cookies and browser history

59

22

7

8

3

f. Used a service that allows you to browse
the web anonymously, such as a proxy
server, Tor software, or VPN
g. Encrypted your phone calls, text
messages or email

9

67

9

10

4

10

68

10

10

3

h. Decided not to use a website because
they asked for you real name

23

55

12

7

3

i. Deleted or edited something you posted
in the past

29

46

14

8

3

j. Asked someone to remove something
posted about you

11

63

15

7

3
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k. Used a public computer to browse
anonymously

12

68

12

6

3

l. Used a search engine that doesn’t keep
track of your search history

15

52

11

19

3

m. Refused to provide information about
yourself that wasn’t relevant to the
transaction

57

23

9

8

3

Notes. A total of 495 of 498 respondents answered this question.
Table 44
Question 21: (sp12) Do you think people should have the ability to use the internet
completely anonymously for certain kinds of online activities?
Answer

Percentage

Code

Yes

55

B

No

16

A

Don’t know

27

C

Refused

2

C

Notes. A total of 496 of 498 respondents answered this question.
The following data were obtained from Survey 3.
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Table 45
Question 22: (sp7) When an app on your smartphone or tablet seeks your permission to
use your location, how often do you allow it to use your location?
Answer

Percentage

Code

Frequently

22

A

Sometimes

36

A

Hardly ever

28

B

Never

11

B

Refused / not asked

3

C

Notes. A total of 317 of 320 respondents answered this question.
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Table 46
Question 23: (sp9) Which of these statements accurately describes you?
Answer

I am generally a private

Percentage

Code

65

B

34

A

1

C

person and like to keep
to myself
I am generally an open
person who enjoys
sharing with others
Refused

Notes. A total of 474 of 475 respondents answered this question.
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Table 47
Question 24: (sp10) How much, if anything, have you heard about the government
collecting information about telephone calls, emails and other online communications as
part of the efforts to monitor terrorist activity?
Answer

Percentage

Code

A lot

31

A

A little

56

A

Nothing at all

6

B

Don’t know

6

C

Refused

1

C

Notes. A total of 474 of 475 respondents answered this question.
Table 48
Question 25: (sp12) In your opinion, is it acceptable or unacceptable for the American
government to monitor communications from individuals suspected of terrorist activities?
Answer

Percentage

Code

Acceptable

82

A

Unacceptable

15

B

Refused

2

C

Notes. A total of 473 of 475 respondents answered this question.
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Table 49
Question 26: (sp13) In your opinion, is it acceptable or unacceptable for the American
government to monitor communications from American leaders?
Answer

Percentage

Code

Acceptable

60

A

Unacceptable

38

B

Refused

2

C

Notes. A total of 473 of 475 respondents answered this question.
Table 50
Question 27: (sp14) In your opinion, is it acceptable or unacceptable for the American
government to monitor communications from American citizens?

Answer

Percentage

Code

Acceptable

40

A

Unacceptable

57

B

Refused

3

C

Notes. A total of 472 of 475 respondents answered this question.
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Table 51
Question 28: (sp15) In your opinion, is it acceptable or unacceptable for the American
government to monitor communications from citizens of other countries?
Answer

Percentage

Code

Acceptable

54

A

Unacceptable

44

B

Refused

2

C

Notes. A total of 473 of 475 respondents answered this question.
Table 52
Question 29: (sp16) In your opinion, is it acceptable or unacceptable for the American
government to monitor communications from leaders of other countries?
Answer

Percentage

Code

Acceptable

60

A

Unacceptable

37

B

Refused

3

C

Notes. A total of 472 of 475 respondents answered this question.
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Table 53
Question 30: (sp17) Overall, how concerned are you about government surveillance of
American’s data and electronic communications?
Answer

Percentage

Code

Very concerned

17

B

Somewhat concerned

35

B

Not very concerned

33

A

Not at all concerned

13

A

Refused

2

C

Notes. A total of 473 of 475 respondents answered this question.
Table 54
Question 31: (sp20) Do you generally think the courts and judges do a good job
balancing the public’s right to privacy and the needs of law enforcement and
intelligence agencies to collect information for investigations?
Answer

Percentage

Code

Yes

48

A

No

49

B

Refused

3

C

Notes. A total of 472 of 475 respondents answered this question.
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Table 55
Question 32: (sp21) How concerned are you about government monitoring of your
activity on social media websites such as Facebook or Twitter?
Answer

Percentage

Code

Very concerned

14

B

Somewhat concerned

17

B

Not very concerned

24

A

Not at all concerned

24

A

Not applicable

19

C

Notes. A total of 454 of 475 respondents answered this question.
Table 56
Question 33: (sp22) How concerned are you about government monitoring of your
activity on search engines?
Answer

Percentage

Code

Very concerned

15

B

Somewhat concerned

24

B

Not very concerned

30

A

Not at all concerned

23

A

Not applicable

5

C

Notes. A total of 468 of 475 respondents answered this question.

144
Table 57
Question 34: (sp24) How concerned are you about government monitoring of your
activity on your cell phone?
Answer

Percentage

Code

Very concerned

17

B

Somewhat concerned

20

B

Not very concerned

30

A

Not at all concerned

24

A

Not applicable

7

C

Notes. A total of 465 of 475 respondents answered this question.
Table 58
Question 35: (sp26) How concerned are you about government monitoring of your
activity on your mobile apps?
Answer

Percentage

Code

Very concerned

12

B

Somewhat concerned

17

B

Not very concerned

28

A

Not at all concerned

22

A

Not applicable

19

C

Notes. A total of 453 of 475 respondents answered this question.
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Table 59
Question 36: (sp27) How concerned are you about government monitoring of your
activity on your email?
Answer

Percentage

Code

Very concerned

19

B

Somewhat concerned

19

B

Not very concerned

31

A

Not at all concerned

23

A

Not applicable

4

C

Notes. A total of 468 of 475 respondents answered this question.
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Table 60
Question 37: (sp29) Since learning about U.S. phone and internet monitoring, how much,
if at all, would you say you have changed the way you use any of the following?
Answer/

A great deal
B

Code

Somewhat
B

Not
much
A

Not at
Not
Refused
all
applicable
A
C
C

a. Social
media
like
Twitter
b. Search
engines
c. Your
landline
phone
d. Your cell
phone

7

7

18

45

22

1

7

10

23

56

4

1

5

4

17

51

23

<1

7

7

23

57

5

1

e. Text
messages
f. Mobile
apps
g. Your
email
accounts

7

6

19

53

15

0

8

6

17

49

21

<1

8

10

23

57

2

1

Notes. A total of 417 respondents answered this question.
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Table 61
Question 38: (sp32) Since learning about the government’s phone and internet
monitoring programs, have you done any of the following in an effort to hide or
shield your information from the government?
Answer

I have
done
this

I have not
done this, but
have
considered it

B

A

a. Unfriended or
unfollowed
people on social
media
b. Deleted social
media accounts

13

8

52

26

1

8

9

58

24

1

c. Used social
media less often

15

9

50

24

<1

d. Changed your
privacy settings
on social media
e. Made more
phone calls
instead of
communicating
online
f. Avoided using
certain terms in
online
communications
g. Avoided certain
apps

17

10

47

24

1

8

10

70

11

1

13

10

67

9

1

15

6

56

22

1

Code

I have not
Not
Refused
done this applicable
and have
not
considered
it
A
C
C
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h. Uninstalled
certain apps

13

5

57

25

1

i. Used
pseudonyms

8

6

68

16

1

j. Not used certain
terms in search
engine queries
you thought
might trigger
scrutiny
k. Spoke more in
person instead
of
communicating
online or over
the phone

11

13

64

11

1

14

9

67

9

1

Notes. A total of 417 respondents answered this question.
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Table 62
Question 39: (sp35) Since learning about U.S. phone and internet monitoring, have you
adopted any of the following tools or strategies to make your communications and
activities more private?
Answer

Code

Hav
Not
I have not
e
adopted
adopted
adop
this, but
this and
ted
have
have not
this considered considered

I
don’t
know
what
this is

Not
applicable
to me

Refused

B

A

A

C

C

C

a. Used a
search engine
that doesn’t
keep track of
your search
history

10

12

53

13

12

1

b. Adopted
email
encryption,
such as PGP

2

10

46

31

11

1

c. Adopted
mobile
encryption for
calls or text
messages

4

8

48

24

15

2

d. Used more
complex
passwords

25

12

48

6

8

1
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e. Proxy
servers

3

7

41

33

13

2

f. Privacy
browser plugins

5

7

43

31

13

1

g. Anonymity
software like
Tor

2

5

40

39

13

1

Notes. A total of 417 respondents answered this question.
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Table 63
Question 40: (sp37) Is it acceptable or unacceptable for the government to monitor the
communications of U.S. citizens if the person did the following?
Answer/
Code

Acceptable Unacceptable Refused
A

B

C

Visited a child pornography site

77

19

4

Was reported by a bank to be making unusual
withdraws

51

45

4

Made search engine inquires for the keyword
explosives and automatic weapons

65

30

4

Visited websites of known anti-American
groups

67

29

4

Exchanged emails with an Imam who preached
against infidels

68

28

4

Used encryption software to hide files

49

47

4

Notes. A total of 475 respondents answered this question.
The following data were obtained from Survey 4.
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Table 64
Question 41: (sp1) Privacy means different things to different people today. In thinking
about all of your daily interactions—both online and offline—please tell me how
important each of the following are to you

Answer/

Very
important
B

Somewhat
B

Not
very
A

Not
at
all
A

a. Being in
control of
who can
get
information
about you

74

19

3

1

1

2

b. Not having
someone
watch you
or listen to
you
without
your
permission

67

20

8

1

2

2

c. Controlling
what
information
is collected
about you

65

25

5

1

1

3

Code

Not
Refused
applicable
C
C
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d. Having
individuals
in social
and work
situations
not ask you
things that
are highly
personal

44

36

13

Notes. A total of 461 respondents answered this question.

2

4

2
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Appendix B: Figures

Figure B10. Question 19 (sp9)

Figure B11. Question 20 (sp11) a
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Figure B12. Question 20 (sp11) c

Figure B13. Question 20 (sp11) d
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Figure B14. Question 20 (sp11) e
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* the responses to this question appear to contraindicate the responses to the other
questions in the same category. I believe this is due to the phrasing of the question; that is
clearing cookies or browser history is not necessarily privacy related. Cyber professionals
and computer system-health software routinely undertake these tasks for non-privacy
related reasons.

Figure B15. Question 20 (sp11) f
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Figure B16. Question 20 (sp11) g

Figure B17. Question 20 (sp11) h
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Figure B18. Question 20 (sp11) i

Figure B19. Question 20 (sp11) j
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Figure b20. Question 20 (sp11) k

Figure B21. Question 20 (sp11) l.
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Figure B22. Question 20 (sp11) m

Figure B23. Question 37 (sp29) b. (contraindicative result could be due to the vagueness
of the question phraseology and its implications for non-privacy related reasons)
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Figure B24. Question 37 (sp29) c.

Figure B25. Question 37 (sp29) d.
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Figure B26. Question 37 (sp29) e.

Figure B27. Question 37 (sp29) f.
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Figure B28. Question 37 (sp29) g.

Figure B29. Question 38 (sp32) a.
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Figure B30. Question 38 (sp32) b.

Figure B31. Question 38 (sp32) f.
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Figure B32. Question 38 (sp32) d.

Figure B33. Question 38 (sp32) e.

167

Figure B34. Question 38 (sp32) f.

Figure B35. Question 38 (sp32) g.
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Figure B36. Question 38 (sp32) h.

Figure B37. Question 38 (sp32) i.
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Figure B38. Question 38 (sp32) j.

Figure B39. Question 38 (sp32) k.
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Figure B40. Question 39 (sp35) a.

Figure B41. Question 39 (sp35) b.
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Figure B42. Question 39 (sp35) c.

Figure B43. Question 39 (sp35) d.
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Figure B44. Question 39 (sp35) e.

Figure B45. Question 39 (sp35) f.
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Figure B46. Question 39 (sp35) i.

Figure B47. Question 39 (sp35) j.

